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ABSTRACT 
 This Article is the first to detail the balance legislatures and courts have struck between 
private property rights and the compelling public interest in energy production. By examin-
ing how property rights have consistently yielded to energy development from colonial times 
to the most recent decisions involving hydraulic fracturing (“fracking”), it identifies a coher-
ent energy/property balance that has shaped property expectations to accommodate energy 
needs. The Article then applies this insight to current disputes pitting aggressive renewable 
energy policies—such as nuisance immunity or mandatory installations on private proper-
ty—against fundamental property expectations: the right to exclude and the right to use and 
enjoy. In doing so, it analyzes how the energy/property balance informs reasonable property 
expectations and helps resolve Fifth Amendment takings claims. The central conclusion is 
this: throughout our legal history and into our energy future, when circumstances pit pri-
vate property rights against the societal need for energy, i.e., when it comes to energy versus 
property, energy tends to win. 
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I.   INTRODUCTION 
 Energy is a big deal right now. Whether the concern is fostering 
domestic energy security, developing energy resources sustainably 
and economically, or adjusting the energy portfolio in response to 
climate change, the United States is searching for the proper policies 
to shape its energy future.  
 As a result, renewable energy is a big deal right now. With the po-
tential to address all of the concerns listed above, renewable energy 
development has become a favored policy at all levels of government. 
In fact, some state and municipal governments have begun aggres-
sively promoting renewable energy projects even at the residential 
level. With such policies hitting close to home, questions arise about 
how far governments may go in encouraging or even mandating the 
installation of renewable energy technologies on private property. 
After all, property is also a big deal. 
 Part of the answer is that both energy and property have been a 
big deal for a long while, and this is not the first time they have come 
into tension. Even in the days when firewood was our principal ener-
gy source, the pressing social need for energy production fell into con-
flict with private property expectations. Though these energy-versus-
property disputes have arisen across multiple centuries and in a va-
riety of resource contexts, the results maintain a surprising coher-
ence. In striking the energy/property balance, legislatures and courts 
have consistently shaped private property expectations to accommo-
date energy development. Thus when it comes down to energy versus 
property, energy tends to win.    
 This Article is the first to trace and synthesize this energy/property 
balance comprehensively, analyzing how property rights have yielded 
to energy development in instances spanning from firewood gather-
ing in colonial times to the most recent decisions involving hydraulic 
fracturing (“fracking”). The Article also examines how this legal tra-
dition applies to current policies promoting and mandating renewa-
ble energy installation, offering guidance to both policymakers and 
courts in applying the energy/property balance to an emerging set     
of conflicts. 
 Part II begins by offering the context for current and emerging 
disputes between energy development and property rights, particu-
larly regarding residential and small-scale renewable energy pro-
jects. First, it offers a background overview of the value of small-scale 
renewable energy and the barriers that inhibit its development. It 
then describes aggressive government policies and scholarly pro-
posals for overcoming these barriers by, for example, mandating re-
newable energy installations on private property or limiting neigh-
bors’ rights to interfere with these projects. Part III examines how 
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these aggressive policies create tension with core private property 
rights. It begins by summarizing basic private property expectations, 
such as the right to exclude and the right to use and enjoy, as well as 
the expected property-rule and liability-rule remedies that protect 
these rights. Next, it discusses how aggressive renewable energy pol-
icies alter expectations regarding property rights and remedies, lead-
ing to legal conflicts in the form of takings claims. In turn, Part IV 
contextualizes these conflicts, describing how our legal tradition has 
consistently imposed an energy/property balance that shapes proper-
ty expectations to accommodate energy development. In doing so, it 
reviews precedent spanning from early energy sources such as fire-
wood and water, to emerging electrical production from coal, water, 
and utilities, to oil and gas production, and even to farm production. 
Part V then applies this energy/property balance to aggressive re-
newable energy policies. It begins by analyzing how the energy/   
property balance shapes reasonable property expectations. Then, it 
offers normative reasons for applying the energy/property balance to 
renewable energy development. Finally, it examines how the energy/ 
property balance influences the takings inquiry for aggressive re-
newable energy policies, concluding that none of these policies create 
compensable takings. Lastly, Part VI offers overall conclusions.  
II.   RENEWABLE ENERGY 
 Renewable energy occupies a central role in the planning of our 
energy future. This Part outlines the values of small-scale, distribut-
ed renewable energy measures from environmental, social, and eco-
nomic perspectives. It then discusses the market failures and legal 
disputes that have handicapped the advance of renewables and that 
justify government intervention to promote renewable energy pro-
grams. Finally, it offers an overview of aggressive policy measures 
and scholarly suggestions to promote renewable energy development. 
A.   The Value of Renewable Energy 
 “At a point in the future that is no longer unimaginably remote, 
renewable energy will be necessary to human survival.”1 Even today, 
the majority of Americans favor renewable energy,2 and this broad 
 1. Garrick B. Pursley & Hannah J. Wiseman, Local Energy, 60 EMORY L.J. 877, 891 
(2011). 
 2. See, e.g., PIKE RESEARCH, ENERGY & ENVIRONMENT CONSUMER SURVEY 5, 50 
(2012) (surveying more than one thousand adults and finding that over 75 percent of re-
spondents favored wind and solar energy, although only 47 percent supported biofuels, 
another touted form of renewable energy); Jeffrey M. Jones, In U.S., Alternative Energy 
Bill Does Best Among Eight Proposals, GALLUP (Feb. 2, 2011), http://www.gallup.com/poll/ 
145880/Alternative-Energy-Bill-Best-Among-Eight-Proposals.aspx (surveying more than 
one thousand adults and finding that 83 percent of respondents would support congres-
sional legislation that provides incentives for the use of solar and other renewable energy 
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support is not surprising given the environmental and national secu-
rity benefits of renewables. A shift to clean energy will not only re-
duce greenhouse gas emissions3 that contribute to the enormous and 
exigent problem of climate change,4 but it will also represent a major 
step toward achieving sustainability5 and domestic energy security.6 
Moreover, with electricity demand expected to double by 20507 and 
with the United States at only 10 percent of its potential renewable 
capacity,8 renewable energy expansion must be part of the nation’s 
energy agenda. 
 The challenge, then, is in how to increase renewable energy pro-
duction. One tactic is to rely on large, utility-scale renewables opera-
tions, such as major solar-power or wind-power installations. Such 
grand projects, with their attendant challenges of siting, transmis-
sion, and environmental tradeoffs, have received a great deal of popu-
lar and scholarly attention,9 and they will certainly be a part of      
our energy future. However, smaller scale distributed generation 
sources also have a role to play. Though they have received less at-
tention than utility-scale facilities, distributed generation projects 
“are just as essential as large-scale installations to establishing a 
stable nationwide energy infrastructure powered substantially by 
renewable resources.”10 
sources); Humphrey Taylor, Large Majorities in U.S. and Five Largest European Countries 
Favor More Wind Farms and Subsidies for Bio-fuels, but Opinion Is Split on Nuclear    
Power, HARRIS INTERACTIVE (Oct. 13, 2010), http://www.harrisinteractive.com/News 
Room/HarrisPolls/FinancialTimesHarrisPolls/tabid/449/ctl/ReadCustom%20Default/mid/15
12/ArticleId/584/Default.aspx (surveying more than one thousand adults in a Financial 
Times/ Harris poll and finding that 87 percent of respondents favored an increase in the 
number of wind farms). 
 3. See, e.g., Uma Outka, The Renewable Energy Footprint, 30 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 241, 
253 (2011).   
 4. See Outka, supra note 3, at 253 (suggesting that despite competing concerns, cli-
mate change concerns should be the primary driver behind setting energy policy); Pursley 
& Wiseman, supra note 1, at 890 (noting climate change impacts including “rising seas, 
more severe storms, and longer droughts to higher extinction rates for animal and plant 
species”); Karin P. Sheldon, Upstream of Peril: The Role of Federal Lands in Addressing the 
Extinction Crisis, 24 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 1, 2 (2007) (“[Climate change] includes and eclip-
ses all other environmental issues we face in the twenty-first century . . . .”). 
 5. Hannah Wiseman et al., Formulating a Law of Sustainable Energy: The Renewa-
bles Component, 28 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 827, 836-39 (2011). 
 6. See Pursley & Wiseman, supra note 1, at 890.  
 7. Sara C. Bronin, Curbing Energy Sprawl with Microgrids, 43 CONN. L. REV. 547, 
549 (2010). 
 8. Outka, supra note 3, at 247. 
 9. See, e.g., Bronin, supra note 7; Ronald H. Rosenberg, Making Renewable Energy a 
Reality—Finding Ways to Site Wind Power Facilities, 32 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 
REV. 635 (2008) (focusing on wind development). 
 10. Pursley & Wiseman, supra note 1, at 880; see also GARY D. ALLISON & JOHN L. 
WILLIAMS, THE EFFECTS OF STATE LAWS AND REGULATIONS ON THE DEVELOPMENT OF 
RENEWABLE SOURCES OF ELECTRIC ENERGY 4 (2010), available at http://www.rff.org/RFF/ 
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 Distributed generation sources are on-site electrical generation 
facilities linked closely with their ultimate uses.11 Examples can 
range from “[s]mall-scale renewables on rooftops, parking garages, 
factories, and in yards”12 to “[b]uilding-related renewable energy,” 
such as “solar, wind, geothermal, and fuel cell technologies                   
. . . incorporated into inhabited structures and used by those             
structures’ occupants.”13 
 Among the advantages of distributed generation are the quick 
startup times that can “quickly reduce America’s dependence on fos-
sil fuels.”14 While utility-scale projects may take years to come online, 
“[a] homeowner or business in an area with adequate enabling regu-
lations for small-scale renewable electricity generation can have a 
system up and running in several months.”15 Government entities, 
particularly at the state or local level, have looked to distributed gen-
eration as “an immediate and substantial step toward increasing re-
newable energy capacity.”16 
 Additionally, distributed generation achieves efficiency by elimi-
nating transmission costs and losses. With distributed generation, 
energy production is decentralized and proximate to its end uses.17 
This “maximizes efficiency, because little energy is lost during 
transmission. Thus nearly all of the energy produced by the genera-
tor can be directly used by the end user.”18 Reducing these transmis-
sion losses represents a major energy savings. Since roughly 10 per-
cent of our energy is lost in transmission to buildings19 and since 
“buildings consume 40 [percent] of our energy, use two-thirds of our 
electricity, and emit 40 [percent] of our greenhouse gases,”20 the ad-
vantages of minimizing transmission are far from negligible. In the 
same vein, distributed generation reduces the need for transmission 
infrastructure,21 which saves further costs and leaves a smaller      
geographic footprint than do larger energy installations. By increas-
Documents/RFF-BCK-AllisonandWilliams-StateLaws.pdf; MAXIMILLIAN AUFFHAMMER & 
ALAN H. SANSTAD, ENERGY EFFICIENCY IN THE RESIDENTIAL AND COMMERCIAL SECTORS 2 
(2011), available at http://www.rff.org/RFF/Documents/RFF-BCK-AuffhammerSandstad-
EEResComm.pdf. 
 11. Outka, supra note 3, at 256. 
 12. Pursley & Wiseman, supra note 1, at 899. 
 13. Sara C. Bronin, Building-Related Renewable Energy and the Case of 360 State 
Street, 65 VAND. L. REV. 1875, 1881 (2012). 
 14. Pursley & Wiseman, supra note 1, at 899.  
 15. Id. 
 16. Id. 
 17. Bronin, supra note 7, at 559. 
 18. Bronin, supra note 13, at 1891. 
 19. Bronin, supra note 7, at 556. 
 20. Bronin, supra note 13, at 1884. 
 21. See Pursley & Wiseman, supra note 1, at 897. 
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ing renewable energy production in already developed areas, distrib-
uted generation avoids both the “energy sprawl” and negative ecosys-
tem and species impacts associated with geographically expanding 
energy development.22 
 Another advantage of distributed generation sources is that they 
can combine to form a “microgrid” system of neighborhood-scale en-
ergy grids, localizing and sharing energy production. “Microgrids or-
ganize distributed generation technology into a closed, low-voltage 
system that may address the needs of multiple users using multiple 
kinds of technologies.”23 For example, a microgrid might allow an en-
tire block of homeowners to share and store the power generated by 
an array of solar cells.24 Microgrids therefore allow for additional re-
newable energy capacity and distribution while still reducing de-
mands on both the grid and transmission infrastructure.25 
 Further, these microgrids are valuable in that “[t]hey allow prop-
erty owners to achieve economies of scale by spreading the costs and 
the risk of installation and maintenance among many parties.”26 
Even though distributed generation installation may have negative 
costs (i.e., more than pay for itself),27 the upfront cost may be difficult 
for individuals to bear or may be difficult to finance on individual 
levels.28 Microgrids, however, can allow for easier financing, risk 
spreading, and cooperation.29 For example, a group of neighbors 
might coordinate to install a wind turbine on a vacant lot or invest in 
a solar panel to share the cost and the output.30 This coordination 
also allows groups of neighbors collectively to locate renewable ener-
gy generating stations in the most advantageous location. 
 Finally, microgrid users can also incorporate multiple sources of 
power generation, such as wind and solar, to smooth out supply, and 
because microgrid users may require power at different times of day, 
the shared enterprise can help spread demand.31 Microgrids’ decen-
tralization may even offer greater power reliability because if          
one power source goes down, other power sources can remain fully 
 22. See Outka, supra note 3, at 243. 
 23. Bronin, supra note 7, at 559. 
 24. Id. 
 25. See id. at 561-62; Outka, supra note 3, at 303.  
 26. Bronin, supra note 7, at 547. 
 27. ALAN J. KRUPNICK ET AL., TOWARD A NEW NATIONAL ENERGY POLICY: ASSESSING 
THE OPTIONS – EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 9 (2010), available at http://www.rff.org/RFF/        
Documents/RFF_NEPI_Exec_Summary.pdf. 
 28. Bronin, supra note 7, at 563. 
 29. Id. 
 30. See id. at 551; Bronin, supra note 13, at 1882. 
 31. Bronin, supra note 7, at 563. 
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functional, making energy infrastructure more secure from disaster 
or attack.32 
 Among the distributed renewable options, solar and wind energy 
are primary candidates because they represent two of the four key 
resources for land-based renewable energy,33 are available at a dis-
tributed level,34 have smaller land footprints than other energy alter-
natives,35 and require less water than do other energy sources.36 
Moreover, unlike hydropower, solar and wind energy do not require 
proximity to rivers or construction of dams, which come with their 
own economic and environmental costs. As a result, distributed gen-
eration of wind and solar technologies is particularly attractive at the 
state and local level, and this Article focuses primarily on these forms 
of renewable energy development. 
B.   Renewable Energy Challenges 
 Despite the benefits of such clean energy sources, challenges re-
main in implementing these projects. First, market irrationality or 
distortion often prevents private investment in distributed renewa-
bles and energy efficiency measures. Second, disputes or lack of coop-
eration with neighboring property owners increases costs, creates 
delays, and sometimes forecloses altogether the installation of       
distributed renewables. 
 While market forces have led to some progress in clean energy   
installation,37 market interventions—either through government    
incentives or mandates—have spurred much of the clean energy de-
velopment.38 Such intervention has been necessary due to what has 
been termed “the energy paradox”39 or the “energy efficiency gap”40 
(collectively “the paradox”). The paradox is as follows: though 
“[m]any studies have shown that investing today in energy efficient 
[and renewable energy] technologies will return fuel savings that 
significantly outweigh the initial investment cost over the lifetime    
of the purchase[s,] . . . businesses and consumers often reject        
such investments.”41   
 32. Id. 
 33. Outka, supra note 3, at 247. 
 34. See Bronin, supra note 13, at 1877. 
 35. Outka, supra note 3, at 249.  
 36. See id. at 253. 
 37. See id. at 247.  
 38. Id.  
 39. KRUPNICK ET AL., supra note 27, at 9. 
 40. See, e.g., Brandon Hofmeister, Bridging the Gap: Using Social Psychology to De-
sign Market Interventions to Overcome the Energy Efficiency Gap in Residential Energy 
Markets, 19 SOUTHEASTERN ENVTL. L.J. 1, 4 (2010). 
 41. KRUPNICK ET AL., supra note 27, at 9.  
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 A number of market irrationalities or distortions can account for 
the paradox. First, consumers frequently misjudge or discount the 
benefit of renewable energy investments, often demanding “payback 
periods of perhaps 4 years or less on investments with lifetimes of 15 
to 50 years, implying required rates of return that are well above 
market rates.”42 Additionally, an array of cognitive barriers can also 
prevent rational investment in energy efficiency or renewable ener-
gy.43 For example, the endowment effect and failure to ignore sunk 
costs leads people to rely on previous investments rather than rein-
vesting in new, more efficient technologies, even when a pure cost-
benefit analysis suggests such reinvestment.44 Second, a status quo 
bias influences people to rely on default positions, such as dated con-
struction practices or non-renewable energy sources, rather than 
reevaluating investment in renewables or energy efficiency.45 Third, 
people tend to undervalue costs and benefits that are not “vivid” or 
“emotional,” and many basic efficiency or energy-supply choices do 
not register as vivid.46 Fourth, many irrationally perceive environ-
mentally friendly products as either poorer performing or bearing a 
cost premium.47 Fifth, in our mobile society, people may believe they 
will sell properties or move before they see a payoff for a renewable 
energy investment.48 Finally, split incentives may exist for property 
owners; for example, landlords often have no incentive to invest in 
energy efficiency or renewable energy because the tenant pays the 
utility bill.49 The net result of these phenomena singularly or in com-
bination is that the market becomes distorted against distributed 
generation of renewable energy, hampering its expansion. 
 42. Id. Economists disagree as to whether this energy paradox is caused by hidden 
costs (for example, if new technologies are unreliable or inferior), or market failures (such 
as imperfect information about the benefits of new technologies, split incentives of those 
renting versus owning property, or lack of capital and other financing problems) that would 
require affirmative policies to correct. See id. For an in depth discussion of the theories, 
particularly market failure scenarios, underlying the energy paradox, see AUFFHAMMER & 
SANSTAD, supra note 10, at 20-29; Hofmeister, supra note 40, at 14-18.  
  Many advocates of standards to mandate or promote energy-efficiency technolo-
gies believe that market failure alone explains the energy paradox, but studies can meas-
ure the costs and benefits of energy-efficiency policies with differing assumptions for com-
plete, partial, and no market failures. See KRUPNICK ET AL., supra note 27, at 8-10, 13-14. 
 43. See Hofmeister, supra note 40, at 18-31. 
 44. Id. at 21. 
 45. Id. at 22.  
 46. See id. at 28-29. 
 47. Id. at 30.  
 48. See Pursley & Wiseman, supra note 1, at 903-04. 
 49. See, e.g., Lucas Davis & David I. Levine, Renting Inefficiency, ENERGY ECONOMICS 
EXCH. (Nov. 26, 2012), http://energyathaas.wordpress.com/2012/11/26/renting-inefficiency; 
see also Matthew L. Wald, Why Renters Use More Electricity, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 20, 2012, 
2:27 PM), http://green.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/12/20/why-renters-use-more-electricity. 
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 In addition to these market irrationalities, a lack of cooperation 
between neighboring property owners has also inhibited distributed 
generation and microgrid development.50 For example, even though 
shared distributed generation and microgrid projects can drive costs 
down and increase reliability for neighbors, few of these projects   
exist51 because development of these projects requires coordination 
and shared infrastructure such as piping, distribution lines, and 
monitoring equipment.52  
 Beyond failing to cooperate, neighbors may also be outright hostile 
to renewable energy development. As Troy Rule has put it, “The 
greatest opponents of renewable energy development are often those 
living next door.”53 This has certainly been the case for proposed wind 
installations, which have been the frequent target of nuisance suits 
from neighbors whose complaints have ranged from aesthetic impacts 
and light reflection, to noise and vibrations, to the risks of ice being 
thrown from the blades.54 Moreover, opposition by neighbors is a par-
ticularly acute impediment to distributed generation and microgrids, 
which may bring renewables projects closer to objecting homes, busi-
nesses, and populated areas.55 For example, neighbors “may reject 
microgrid technologies, taking a ‘not-in-my-backyard’ approach that 
drives distributed generation projects outward,”56 or they may “object 
to restrictions placed on their activities when a renewable energy 
project is sited nearby.”57 Altogether, these issues of market distor-
tion and lack of cooperation among property owners impede distrib-
uted generation and microgrid development.  
C.   Aggressive Efforts to Promote Renewable Energy 
 To overcome these barriers, both government entities and scholars 
have called for aggressive efforts to promote distributed renewable 
energy installation through both mandates and limitations on neigh-
bors’ ability to interfere with renewable energy projects. 
 50. See Bronin, supra note 13, at 1878; Bronin, supra note 7, at 568, 570-72.  
 51. Bronin, supra note 7, at 565. 
 52. Id. at 583. 
 53. Troy A. Rule, Renewable Energy and the Neighbors, 2010 UTAH L. REV. 1223, 
1223. 
 54. See Renner Kincaid Walker, The Answer, My Friend, Is Blowin’ in the Wind: Nui-
sance Suits and the Perplexing Future of American Wind Farms, 16 DRAKE J. AGRIC. L. 
509, 520-21 (2011); Brett Slensky & Angela Pappas, Wind Power Projects, Nuisance 
Claims, and Right-to-Farm, ABA AGRIC. MGMT. COMM. NEWSL., Nov. 2010, at 9, 9-11 
(summarizing common complaints against wind installations). 
 55. See Bronin, supra note 13, at 1892; see also Bronin, supra note 7, at 571-72. 
 56. Bronin, supra note 7, at 579. 
 57. Bronin, supra note 13, at 1893. 
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1.   Renewable Energy Mandates  
 Most policies to encourage renewables either rely on market in-
centives, such as tax rebates, or utility-driven initiatives,58 like re-
newable portfolio standards (“RPS”)59 or net metering.60 While these 
have certainly helped promote renewable energy, they have not effec-
tively spurred distributed generation.61 In response, some govern-
ment entities have turned to mandates for distributed renewable en-
ergy.62 After all, “[i]t is much easier to be efficient when the user has 
no choice.”63 
 As a modest example of such mandates, all states have developed 
some kind of energy efficiency building code.64 Moreover, several mu-
nicipal governments, including Boston, have imposed mandatory 
green building standards on the private sector,65 similar to the ap-
proach taken by some members of the European Union.66 Taking 
these mandates a step further, New Jersey requires that a developer 
of a new home offer to install or have someone else install solar ener-
gy for the prospective owner.67 
 California has been even more aggressive. The California Energy 
Commission recently approved standards for new homes and com-
mercial buildings set to take effect on July 1, 2014.68 These standards 
require, among other measures, that both residential and commercial 
 58. See ALLISON & WILLIAMS, supra note 10, at 4. 
 59. RPS mandate that a certain percentage or amount of electrical energy come from 
renewable sources, but these impact utilities most directly. Id. 
 60. With net metering, a customer-generator can sell electricity back to the grid while 
still relying on the grid when their renewable source is not performing. Id.  
 61. See id.; see also Melissa Powers, The Cost of Coal: Climate Change and the End of 
Coal as a Source of “Cheap” Electricity, 12 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 407, 434 (2010). 
 62. Substantial government market intervention, including mandates, has been used 
to promote development of other energy resources. See, e.g., 1 BRUCE M. KRAMER & 
PATRICK R. MARTIN, THE LAW OF POOLING AND UNITIZATION § 1.02 (3d ed. 1989) (“The his-
tory of oil and gas development in the United States leads to the inevitable conclusion that 
the legal, economic, and engineering worlds have never reached a level of coordination that 
would allow for the efficient and equitable development of oil and gas reservoirs without 
substantial governmental intervention.”). 
 63. Bronin, supra note 13, at 1888. 
 64. ALLISON & WILLIAMS, supra note 10, at 154. 
 65. See Carl J. Circo, Using Mandates and Incentives to Promote Sustainable Con-
struction and Green Building Projects in the Private Sector: A Call for More State Land Use 
Policy Initiatives, 112 PENN. ST. L. REV. 731, 758-59 (2008). 
 66. See Nancy J. King & Brian J. King, Creating Incentives for Sustainable Buildings: 
A Comparative Law Approach Featuring the United States and the European Union, 23 VA. 
ENVTL. L.J. 397, 449 (2005). 
 67. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 52:27D-141.4(a) (West 2013); Pursley & Wiseman, supra note 1, 
at 911-12. 
 68. Revised Effective Date for the 2013 California Building Energy Efficiency Stand-
ards, CAL. ENERGY COMM’N (Dec. 11, 2013), http://www.energy.ca.gov/title24/ 
2013standards/2013_standards_revised_effective_date.html.  
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roofs include “solar-ready” rooftops to allow for the future addition of 
photovoltaic panels.69 While the standards merely require that roofs 
“make[] space available” for “easier installation” of solar cells “at a 
future date”70 and do not command the immediate installation of    
solar cells,71 they still impose affirmative mandates to support dis-
tributed generation.72 The code also requires that electrical service 
panels have a reserved space for breakers serving “future solar     
electric installation[s].”73 
 Some U.S. jurisdictions have imposed even further reaching poli-
cies by mandating installation of certain renewable and energy effi-
cient technologies. This is the approach taken in Puerto Rico,74 which 
requires installation of solar hot water heaters. Similarly, the Cali-
fornia Energy Commission has adopted the “Zero Net Energy” goal 
that by 2020 all new homes and by 2030 all commercial buildings 
“must use a combination of improved efficiency and distributed re-
newable generation to meet 100 percent of their annual energy 
need.”75 To meet this goal, further mandates, such as rooftop photo-
voltaic cells, appear imminent.   
 In addition to these policies, scholars and commentators endorse 
even more ambitious mandates to promote distributed renewables 
and energy efficiency.76 Some scholars justify such mandates as nec-
 69. News Release, Cal. Energy Comm’n, Energy Commission Approves More Efficient 
Buildings for California’s Future (May 31, 2012), available at http://www.energy.ca.gov/ 
releases/2012_releases/2012-05-31_energy_commission_approves_more_efficient_buildings 
_nr.html. 
 70. CAL. ENERGY COMM’N, CALIFORNIA’S 2013 — RESIDENTIAL: BUILDING ENERGY 
EFFICIENCY STANDARDS (2013), available at http://www.energy.ca.gov/title24/ 
2013standards/rulemaking/documents/2013_Building_Energy_Efficiency_Standards_   
infographics.pdf. 
 71. Dana Hull, California Poised to Require ‘Solar Ready Roofs’ on New Homes and 
Buildings, SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS (May 30, 2012, 3:06 PM), 
http://www.mercurynews.com/business/ci_20744057/california-poised-require-solar-ready-
roofs-new-homes. 
 72. CAL. ENERGY COMM’N, PROPOSED 2013 BUILDING ENERGY EFFICIENCY STANDARDS 
74, 129, 132 (2012), available at http://www.energy.ca.gov/2012publications/CEC-400-2012-
004/CEC-400-2012-004-15DAY.pdf. 
 73. Id. at 131. 
 74. Puerto Rico – Building Energy Code with Mandatory Solar Water Heating, DSIRE, 
http://www.dsireusa.org/incentives/incentive.cfm?Incentive_Code=PR03R&re=0&ee=1 (last 
updated Feb. 21, 2013). 
 75.  News Release, Cal. Energy Comm’n, supra note 69. Further, cities like San Jose 
have set goals to “ ‘[r]eceive 100 percent of [its] electrical power from clean renewable 
sources’ by 2025.” Pursley & Wiseman, supra note 1, at 897 (quoting CITY OF SAN JOSE, 
2009-2010 CLEAN TECH LEGISLATIVE AGENDA 2 (2009), available at 
http://www.sanjoseca.gov/DocumentCenter/View/3701). 
 76. See, e.g., King & King, supra note 66, at 449 (2005) (“The lack of federal legislation 
mandating or providing incentives for sustainable construction practices constitutes a sig-
nificant impediment to the development of nationwide sustainable construction programs 
in the United States.”); cf. Circo, supra note 65, at 764 (“Many studies expose the relative 
merits of imposing regulations and other government mandates on markets versus using 
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essary to overcome the market failures77 and cognitive barriers78 dis-
cussed above or to correct for externalities in building development.79 
Others assert that even if the market is functioning correctly, renew-
able energy mandates are appropriate because of the benefits of 
bringing renewables into production80 and because mandates are ef-
fective as a regulatory tool for achieving policy objectives cost-
effectively.81 Additionally, such renewables mandates generate 
“greater demand (to spur technological progress)” and “cost reduc-
tions that come from both experience and economies of scale.”82      
Finally, mandates for distributed generation, whether solar or    
wind, would reduce the footprint of renewable energy, allowing for 
greater generation without further environmental disturbance.83 To 
quote one commentator, “[G]overnment should no more recoil from 
green building [and renewable energy] mandates than it does from 
sanitary codes.”84 
 Commentators have even suggested specific forms that the man-
dates may take. One thoughtful scholar has suggested that clean en-
ergy mandates are justified not only for new homes,85 as California 
has imposed, but also for existing buildings.86 Further, a number of 
incentives and other economic instruments to adjust market forces. Among other things, 
we know that economic instruments carefully designed to work with market forces are 
often effective, but we also know that direct regulation may be essential in the face of mar-
ket failures or in light of institutional and historical factors.”); Pursley & Wiseman, supra 
note 1, at 901 (“[M]unicipal governments must be free to enact all local land use regula-
tions and standards, including building codes and zoning, necessary to encourage and en-
sure relatively predictable regulation of the installation of renewables.”); id. at 907 (“The 
need to enable (or, in some cases, command) local governments to reshape land use laws to 
accommodate distributed renewables . . . was well documented during the failed push to-
ward renewables in the 1970s . . . .”).  
 77. Hofmeister, supra note 40, at 63 (“Closing the energy efficiency gap is important 
enough to justify market interventions by the government.”).  
 78. See id. at 21, 66.   
 79. See Circo, supra note 65, at 744, 753, 762-63.  
 80. See ALLISON & WILLIAMS, supra note 10, at 156; see also Circo, supra note 65, at 
732-33.  
 81. See Hofmeister, supra note 40, at 69. 
 82. KRUPNICK ET AL., supra note 27, at 18; see also Hofmeister, supra note 40, at 55. 
 83. Cf. Outka, supra note 3, at 302 (“Much like reusing land for a large-scale facility, 
onsite energy generation minimizes the footprint with rooftop solar panels, small-scale 
wind, and combined heat and power systems built into existing structures. . . . Yet ‘cities 
and residences cover about 140 million acres of land’ in the U.S., according to DOE, and 
considering land use only, solar panels could supply ‘every kilowatt-hour of our nation’s 
current electricity requirements’ on just 7 percent of that area—‘on roofs, on parking lots, 
along highway walls, on the sides of buildings, and in other dual use scenarios.’ ” (quoting 
U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, PV FAQS: HOW MUCH LAND WILL PV NEED TO SUPPLY OUR 
ELECTRICITY? (2004), available at http://www1.eere.energy.gov/solar/pdfs/35097.pdf)). 
 84. Circo, supra note 65, at 780. 
 85. Hofmeister, supra note 40, at 70. 
 86. Id. at 72-73. 
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scholars have pointed out the need for policies to promote microgrid 
development and siting, 87 and Sara Bronin has suggested that states 
“should consider laws that provide special treatment for siting mi-
crogrid projects,”88 including “requir[ing] localities to include microgrid 
siting as a mandatory element of their comprehensive plans.”89   
 Finally, some scholars and policy advisors have called for even 
more ambitious measures to promote maximum renewable energy 
productivity for immediate greenhouse gas reductions,90 though con-
cerns over takings challenges have constrained these policies.91 For 
example, to promote microgrids and overcome neighbors’ lack of co-
ordination, scholarship suggests that states might need to impose 
mandatory microgrid installation in certain small-scale energy dis-
tricts.92 Similarly, to derive maximum benefit from renewable energy 
installations, a state might require installation of renewable energy 
facilities on prime locations for wind and solar energy production.93 
Finally, to maximize expansion of distributed generation and tie it 
into existing energy grids, a state might mandate that certain parcels 
or buildings allow third parties, such as utilities, to install and oper-
ate renewable technologies on their rooftops.94   
 87. See, e.g., Bronin, supra note 7, at 580-81 (surveying scholarship). 
 88. Id. at 579. 
 89. Id. at 580. 
 90. See, e.g., Div. on Earth & Life Studies, Nat’l Research Council, Expert Report: 
Limiting the Magnitude of Climate Change, NAT’L ACAD. OF SCIS. (2010), 
http://dels.nas.edu/Report/Limiting-Magnitude-Climate-Change/12785 (calling for immedi-
ate implementation of renewable energy to the maximum possible capacity); cf. Bronin, 
supra note 13, at 1891 (“Over the next twenty-three years, three-fourths of our building 
stock will be built new or renovated. In light of that opportunity, the ease with which prop-
erty owners could either develop buildings with BRRE, or retrofit existing buildings with 
BRRE, is a matter of pressing concern. If we get the legal framework correct now, it is 
more likely that we will be able to count on more BRRE being developed in the future.” 
(footnote omitted)); Alexandra B. Klass, The Frontier of Eminent Domain, 79 U. COLO. L. 
REV. 651, 689 (2008) (“This is a critical time to be reflecting on property rights . . . . The 
nation as a whole is struggling with energy needs, climate change, and a host of other con-
cerns that rest in large part on how to best use and allocate property and resources.”).  
 91. E.g., Bronin, supra note 7, at 583; Troy Rule, A Downwind View of the Cathedral: 
Using Rule Four to Allocate Wind Rights, 46 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 207, 242 (2009). 
 92. But cf. Bronin, supra note 7, at 583. 
 93. Cf. Rule, supra note 91, at 213 (“All else equal, public policy favors rules that allo-
cate competing wind rights so as to maximize the amount of wind energy produced over the 
long run from discrete quantities of property and capital investment. Properties with con-
sistent average wind speeds and other characteristics ideal for wind energy production are 
a scarce and highly valuable resource. Additionally, although wind is itself renewable, the 
costs of relocating a wind turbine after initial installation can be quite substantial. . . . 
[R]ules are needed to ensure efficient use of property that is situated near boundary lines 
and is thus at risk of being underutilized.” (footnotes omitted)). 
 94. Powers, supra note 61, at 435-36 (“[I]n urban areas, instead of encouraging rate-
payers to install privately owned photovoltaic cells on their roofs, utilities could perform 
the installation and retain ownership of the solar array, while providing the ratepayer a 
discounted electricity rate in exchange for allowing the utility to site the solar array on the 
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2.   Limits on Neighbors’ Rights 
 Along with mandates, some jurisdictions and commentators also 
support efforts to promote renewable energy by limiting neighbors’ 
ability to challenge or interfere with renewables projects. For exam-
ple, New Jersey95 and, arguably, Vermont96 have statutorily limited 
nuisance suits against wind installations. Similarly, some state laws 
“protect the right to install solar panels on one’s home.”97 Commenta-
tors have called for expansion and widespread adoption of such nui-
sance-immunizing policies,98 noting that “[t]he time may be ap-
proaching when the federal government may need not only to en-
courage the use of clean energy devices, but also to protect the right 
to install, use, and maintain them.”99 
 In addition to limiting nuisance suits, states have also created re-
gimes that prevent neighbors from using their property in a manner 
that might interfere with the productivity of installed renewables. 
For example, both Wyoming and New Mexico have statutes that    
protect installed solar energy cells from interference by imposing     
an easement in the airspace above neighboring properties.100 Again, 
commentators have called for expansion of such policies, suggesting 
that state-level lawmakers “eliminate both preexisting and future 
deed restrictions that impinge on solar rights, restrict neighbors’ 
ability to obstruct existing solar collectors, prevent homeowners’    
associations from limiting solar rights, and require localities             
ratepayer’s roof. If the utility could recover expenses associated with the installation and 
construction of the infrastructure necessary to implement the distributed generation sys-
tem, it would have ample incentives to revolutionize the electricity system. Because the 
technology to develop distributed generation already exists, utilities could undertake the 
process almost immediately.” (footnote omitted)); Nathanial Gronewold, Industry’s N.J. 
Boom Casts Shadow over Program that Spurred It, GREENWIRE (Aug. 25, 2011), 
http://www.eenews.net/stories/1059953151 (Gronewald describes the utility-driven process 
for solar development, where, as opposed to independently owned rooftop projects, a utility 
company owns and operates a rooftop solar system located on another property owner’s 
rooftop. In these instances, the property owner signs a purchase power agreement to buy 
the electricity produced at a discounted rate. Though entry into such programs has been 
voluntary, mandates may be necessary to increase such renewable capacity). These instal-
lations have been especially popular with “big-box” retail stores. See Sarah Korones, Big-
box Stores Lead the Pack in Solar Power Use, SMARTPLANET (Sept. 12, 2012, 1:35 AM), 
http://www.smartplanet.com/blog/bulletin/big-box-stores-lead-the-pack-in-solar-power-use. 
 95. See Walker, supra note 54, at 525-26; Slensky & Pappas, supra note 54, at 9. 
 96. See Slensky & Pappas, supra note 54, at 11. 
 97. LaVonda N. Reed-Huff, Dirty Dishes, Dirty Laundry, and Windy Mills: A Frame-
work for Regulation of Clean Energy Devices, 40 ENVTL. L. 859, 881 (2010). 
 98. See id. at 877; Joseph Haupt, Note, A Right to Wind? Promoting Wind Energy by 
Limiting the Possibility of Nuisance Litigation, 3 GEO. WASH. J. ENERGY & ENVTL. L. 256 
(2012). 
 99. Reed-Huff, supra note 97, at 911; see also Walker, supra note 54. 
 100. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 47-3-4(B)(1) (2013); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 34-22-103(b)(i) (2013); 
see also Troy A. Rule, Property Rights and Modern Energy, 20 GEO. MASON L. REV. 803, 
824 (2013). 
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to protect solar rights through zoning ordinances.”101 In the wind      
context, similar policies would protect wind installations from       
upwind interference.102   
 Scholars have identified even further-reaching approaches to max-
imizing wind and solar energy production by not only preventing 
neighbors from interfering with renewable energy installations but 
also compelling neighbors to play a role in developing these re-
sources. For example, Troy Rule has suggested that policies should 
“encourage or facilitate agreements among neighboring landowners 
to promote development of the most productive turbine sites, regard-
less of proximity to property lines.”103 Such policies could encourage 
the greatest output from renewable energy installations, but scholars 
have again expressed reservations that takings concerns might limit 
the implementation of such policies.104 
III.   TENSION WITH PROPERTY EXPECTATIONS 
 As discussed above, by bringing energy production closer to its 
places of use, distributed generation offers many benefits. However, 
by moving energy production closer to homes, businesses, and popu-
lated areas, it also breeds potential conflicts with property expecta-
tions. To examine these conflicts, this Part first offers an overview of 
core property rights expectations. Then it discusses property owners’ 
expectations for the remedies to protect these rights. Finally, it ad-
dresses how aggressive renewable energy policies create tension with 
these expectations. 
A.   Property Rights Expectations: 
The Right to Exclude and the Right to Use and Enjoy 
 Two key expectations lie at the core of the “bundle of rights” that 
comprise property ownership: the right to exclude and the right to 
use and enjoy. 
 In vernacular conceptions of property, the right to exclude is par-
amount. The “home as castle” metaphor remains common, and many 
perceive the right to exclude as both straightforward and inviolate. 
As one scholar has put it:  
Real property law is often treated as a refuge for clear legal rights, 
free from the need to balance competing interests. To take the 
most basic example, I have a right to prevent my neighbor from 
 101. Sara C. Bronin, Response, Solar Rights for Texas Property Owners, 89 TEX. L. 
REV. 79, 80 (2011) (paraphrasing Jamie E. France, Note, A Proposed Solar Access Law for 
the State of Texas, 89 TEX. L. REV. 187, 188-89 (2010)). 
 102. See Rule, supra note 91, at 208-09. 
 103. Id. at 215 (emphasis added). 
 104. See id. at 242.  
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trespassing or encroaching on my land, and my neighbor has a cor-
relative duty not to trespass or encroach.105   
 While the perception of an absolute right to exclude might not get 
the law absolutely right,106 right-to-exclude expectations maintain 
substantial importance even in the highest and most theoretical legal 
conceptions of property. For example, the Supreme Court has recog-
nized the right to exclude as one of the most central and sacred of 
property rights,107 and most jurists and property theorists name the 
right to exclude as a core,108 if not essential and irreducible,109 aspect 
of property rights.   
 Also central to property expectations is the right to use and enjoy, 
which functions both as a right and a limitation on property uses.   
On the one hand, use and enjoyment is a concept of autonomy; a 
property owner’s expectation includes the right to use and enjoy her 
property as she wishes without disturbance. On the other hand, this 
use and enjoyment concept limits a property owner’s autonomy be-
cause she may not make an unreasonable use that injures her neigh-
bor’s correlative expectation of use and enjoyment.110 Thus the expec-
tation of use and enjoyment is reciprocal, both protecting and limit-
ing property uses.  
B.   Property Remedies Expectations:  
Property Rules and Liability Rules 
 Property expectations in the right to exclude and the right to use 
and enjoy would be of little good without government-enforced reme-
dies.111 After all, without the government remedying infringements of 
property expectations, our property system would amount to nothing 
 105. Stewart E. Sterk, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Uncertainty About Property 
Rights, 106 MICH. L. REV. 1285, 1296 (2008). 
 106. See Joan Williams, The Rhetoric of Property, 83 IOWA L. REV. 277, 281 (1998) 
(“[A]n important distinction exists between the (political and legal) rhetoric of absolute 
property rights and the practice of limited ones.” (emphasis in original)); see also id. at 283 
(“[The] intuitive image of absoluteness does not match social practice.”). 
 107. Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 435 (1982); Kaiser 
Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 179-80 (1979); see also Thomas W. Merrill, Property 
and The Right to Exclude, 77 NEB. L. REV. 730, 735 (1998). 
 108. See, e.g., Merrill, supra note 107, at 749.  
 109. Id. at 754. 
 110. As the maxim sic utere tuo ut alienum non laedas instructs, generally one must 
not use property in such a way as to injure the lawful rights of one’s neighbors. 57A AM. 
JUR. 2D Negligence § 89 (1989). 
 111. See, e.g., Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, 
and Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089, 1090 (1972) (noting 
that society must enforce the choice of property entitlements). 
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more than “might makes right.”112 Therefore, a key part of property 
rights expectations is the expectation of remedies.     
 As famously categorized, there are two types of remedies available 
to protect property expectations: property-rule remedies and liability-
rule remedies.113 Property-rule remedies are more absolute and leave 
more autonomy with the holder of the right. If someone wishes to in-
fringe upon a right protected by a property rule, that person “must 
buy it from him in a voluntary transaction in which the value of the 
entitlement is agreed upon by the seller.”114 Thus, when protected by 
a property right, the property owner has complete authority to veto 
any infringement on his rights, and courts will use injunctive relief to 
protect these rights.  
 Liability-rule remedies, on the other hand, leave a property holder 
with less autonomy and control. Rather, a liability-rule protected 
right will give way when a third party is “willing to pay an objective-
ly determined value for it.”115 Under liability-rule protection, a prop-
erty holder does not have an absolute veto power; payment of mone-
tary damages will be sufficient to compromise his property right.  
 Though the traditional dichotomy for remedies is between proper-
ty-rule and liability-rule schemes, a third option is available: the   
“no-liability rule,” which offers no legal remedy for infringement on 
property rights.116  
 These different types of remedies significantly and concretely im-
pact a property owner’s autonomy and, as discussed below, the own-
er’s practical exercise of rights such as exclusion or use of the proper-
ty. An important component of a property’s owner’s expectations is, 
therefore, not only the rights available but also the remedy to enforce 
those rights. A property owner’s expectation may include the abso-
lute protection of a property rule, and since “real property law is gen-
erally marked by a preference for property rules rather than liability 
rules,”117 such a robust expectation is reasonable. This expected rem-
edy comports with autonomy concepts underlying much of our prop-
erty law and includes the advantages of “encouraging investment, 
facilitating market exchange, and protecting subjective value.”118   
 Nonetheless, in some cases—particularly those involving conflict-
ing beneficial uses of neighboring properties or government programs 
 112. Id. 
 113. See id. at 1092. 
 114. Id. 
 115. Id. 
 116. Sterk, supra note 105, at 1316 (“The discussion of property rules and liability 
rules has ignored a third alternative: impose no liability . . . .”). 
 117. Id. at 1319.  
 118. Id. at 1335.     
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facing problems of coordinating multiple parties119—property owners 
might expect only liability-rule protection. Normally, however, a lia-
bility-rule remedy is the minimum expected remedy. Since violations 
of property rights nearly always occasion some type of remedy 
(thereby avoiding being reduced to a “might makes right” system), 
no-liability rules are typically outside the realm of expectation.120  
 Therefore, as detailed below, courts typically enforce the right to 
exclude and the right to use and enjoy with property-rule schemes. 
While courts occasionally employ liability-rule remedies in certain 
circumstances, no-liability schemes are a remarkable rarity in the 
context of property expectations. Accordingly, property expectations 
have developed to include not only rights—those of exclusion and of 
use and enjoyment—but also particular remedies—frequently prop-
erty rules and sometimes liability rules. 
1.   Remedies Protecting the Right to Exclude 
 Courts normally enforce the right to exclude through property 
rules, though in the takings context, where government action in-
fringes on the right for a public purpose, courts apply a liability 
rule.121 For example, a strong property rule is the norm for protecting 
the right to exclude against private individuals. Thus if a third party 
infringes on a property owner’s right to exclude, the property owner 
need not even demonstrate harm122 to enforce her right through tres-
pass and may enjoin future or repeated trespasses.123     
 As against governmental entities acting in their sovereign capaci-
ty, the right to exclude is enforced through a liability rule guaranteed 
by the Fifth Amendment takings doctrine, preventing the govern-
ment from taking private property for public use without just      
compensation.124 The Fifth Amendment guards property rights 
against both regulatory takings (i.e., government regulation that   
goes too far)125 and physical takings (i.e., physical invasion) of pri-
 119. Id. (“Even the most fervent advocates of property rule protection, however, have 
recognized that context is critical. Sometimes, an exclusive focus on market ordering would 
lead to unacceptable inefficiencies.”); see also Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 111. 
 120. Sterk, supra note 105, at 1316 (noting that a no-liability scheme “appears incon-
sistent with any notion of property rights because it leaves an ‘owner’ with no recourse 
against an encroacher”). 
 121. See, e.g., Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 111, at 1093 (“Taney’s house may be 
protected by a property rule in situations where Marshall wishes to purchase it [or] by a 
liability rule where the government decides to take it by eminent domain . . . .”) 
 122. See, e.g., Jacque v. Steenberg Homes, Inc., 563 N.W.2d 154, 159-60 (Wis. 1997) 
(noting that violation of the owners’ property right is, in itself, actual harm). 
 123. See, e.g., Baker v. Howard Cnty. Hunt, 188 A. 223, 230-31 (Md. 1936) (outlining 
the court’s jurisdiction to enjoin continuing or repeated trespass). 
 124. U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
 125. Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922). 
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vate property;126 there are separate legal inquiries, however, for the       
two contexts.127  
 In determining whether a compensable regulatory taking has oc-
curred, the court generally employs the Penn Central analysis to de-
termine if regulation has gone too far in limiting private property 
rights.128 This test examines investment-backed expectations, dimi-
nution of value, and character of government action.129 It is a fact-
intensive and ad hoc process with each case turning on its own      
circumstances, but the right to exclude remains important to the    
inquiry regarding both the character of government action130 and    
the investment-backed expectation. In fact, the right to exclude   
plays such a prominent role that infringement on this right can cre-
ate a taking even when the economic impact is small. As Joseph 
Singer has described:     
[T]he Court has sometimes held that property owners’ right to ex-
clude others from property is so fundamental to ownership that 
government action limiting that right is a taking regardless of the 
overall effect on the value or use of the property. Thus, in Kaiser 
Aetna v. United States, the Court held that imposing the long-
recognized navigational servitude, allowing public access to navi-
gable waters, on a private marina that became navigable because 
of private development, required compensation under the takings 
clause. And in Nollan v. California Coastal Commission, the Court 
held that state imposition of an easement for public access to 
beachfront property constituted a taking requiring compensation. 
In neither case was the overall effect on the value or use of the 
property deemed relevant to whether a taking had occurred.      
Rather, under the Court’s conceptual severance reasoning, simply 
because an important strand in the bundle of property rights,   
here the right to exclude, had been taken, a taking was found to 
have occurred.131 
 While the regulatory takings framework considers the right to ex-
clude as an important component of its balancing test, in the physical 
takings context the right to exclude is the paramount concern. When 
the government physically invades property, no matter how small the 
 126. See Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 435 (1982). 
 127. See Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg’l Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 302, 
324 (2002). 
 128. Penn Central Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104 (1978); John D. Eche-
verria, Is Regulation of Water a Constitutional Taking?, 11 VT. J. ENVTL. L. 579, 591 
(2010). 
 129. Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 124-25; see also Tahoe-Sierra, 535 U.S. at 315 n.10. 
 130. John D. Echeverria, Making Sense of Penn Central, 23 UCLA J. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 
171, 186 n.59 (2009). 
 131. Joseph William Singer & Jack M. Beermann, The Social Origins of Property, 6 
CAN. J. L. & JURISPRUDENCE 217, 223 (1993) (footnotes omitted). 
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physical incursion, the court directly vindicates the right to exclude 
by recognizing a per se taking.132 The physical occupation of even a 
single square foot of property arises to a per se taking133 because 
“constitutional protection for the rights of private property cannot be 
made to depend on the size of the area permanently occupied.”134 The 
Court held as much in Loretto, explaining that “a physical invasion is 
a government intrusion of an unusually serious character”135 and “the 
most serious form of invasion of an owner’s property interests.”136 To 
protect against such invasions, which strike at the heart of the right 
to exclude, the court evaluates physical takings not through a balanc-
ing test but rather through a formalistic single question.137 The court 
simply asks whether there is a physical occupation of the property or 
not, and if there is then it is a compensable taking. Hence, while all 
Fifth Amendment takings law protects property through liability 
rules, the formalistic standard for physical takings can be seen as    
an even more protective version of the liability rule. With per se    
takings the court protects the core right to exclude with a “strict    
liability” rule.138 
 Courts have not shied from applying this strict-liability per se tak-
ings doctrine; rather, they have routinely found physical takings 
when government actors have entered or mandated entry by third 
parties onto private land. 139 For example, the Court of Appeals for 
the Federal Circuit found a physical taking when the Environmental 
Protection Agency mandated that a property owner allow govern-
ment agents to access his land and install wells for monitoring 
groundwater contamination.140 In a similar case, the court held that 
the Border Patrol had committed a physical taking by “assuming sta-
 132. Tahoe-Sierra, 535 U.S. at 322. 
 133. Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 435 (1982). 
 134. Id. at 436-37. 
 135. Id. at 433. 
 136. Id. at 435. 
 137. Singer & Beermann, supra note 131, at 225 (Loretto “formalistically identifies the 
‘right to exclude’ as a core property right which cannot be taken or infringed without com-
pensation. It therefore provides a paradigm case of the Court’s formalistic, natural rights 
approach to the takings clause.”). 
 138. Abraham Bell, Not Just Compensation, 13 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 29, 55 
(2003). 
 139. While in a few instances courts have allowed limited physical incursions without 
takings protection, these typically occur only in the case of countervailing constitutional 
rights. See, e.g., Marc R. Poirier, The Virtue of Vagueness in Takings Doctrine, 24 CARDOZO 
L. REV. 93, 108 n.56 (2002) (citing illustrative cases to show compromises of the right to 
exclude in the face of countervailing rights). 
 140. Hendler v. United States, 175 F.3d 1374, 1377-78 (Fed. Cir. 1999). The court, 
however, found that the landowners were due no compensation for the taking because the 
special benefits conferred by the pollution remediation and monitoring offset the compen-
sation that would be owed. See id. at 1379-83. 
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tionary positions on [Plaintiff’s] land, creating new roads, construct-
ing a permanent tented structure on [Plaintiff’s] land, and installing 
underground motion-detecting sensors.”141 
 In sum, courts have consistently enforced property owners’ right 
to exclude expectations against private parties through strong prop-
erty rules. While the takings doctrine reduces protection to a liability 
rule in the case of government infringement on the right to exclude, 
in the case of physical invasions courts protect the right with a per se 
strict-liability rule. As a result, property expectations in the right to 
exclude include the expectations of property-rule and strict-liability-
rule remedies to enforce that right.    
2.   Remedies Protecting the Right to Use and Enjoy 
 The right to use and enjoy is also protected by a combination of 
property and liability rules. When a private party infringes on the 
right, a property owner has at least a liability-rule remedy and may 
even have a property-rule remedy. When the government infringes 
on the right, the landowner is protected by liability rules. 
 Of course, for a property owner to receive any of these remedies 
she must show an infringement on her right, which is more compli-
cated in the right to use and enjoy context than it is in the right to 
exclude context. Unlike infringements on the right to exclude, which 
manifest in fairly absolute and physical scenarios, infringements on 
the right to use and enjoy involve a balancing of correlative rights. 
For example, determination of whether a neighbor’s actions infringe 
on a landowner’s right to use her property involves balancing the 
neighbor’s usage rights against the landowner’s usage rights.142 In 
such a balancing test, the landowner may not be as certain to demon-
strate an infringement as she would in the right to exclude context.143 
For example, to establish a nuisance—the primary cause of action for 
challenging interference with the right to use and enjoy—a property 
owner must show that a third party has acted unreasonably and in 
doing so infringed on the property’s owner’s right to use and enjoy 
her land.144 This nuisance inquiry usually requires a fact-specific de-
termination of reasonableness and balancing of conflicting uses.145  
 Though the nuisance inquiry may be murky and contextual, the 
ability to bring nuisance suits represents an important property ex-
 141. Otay Mesa Prop., L.P. v. United States, 670 F.3d 1358, 1361, 1365 (Fed. Cir. 
2012). 
 142. THOMAS W. MERRILL & HENRY E. SMITH, PROPERTY: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 27 
(2d ed. 2012). 
 143. Id. 
 144. See id. 
 145. Id. 
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pectation, namely the possibility of vindicating the right to use and 
enjoy and the possibility of receiving a remedy for infringements of 
those rights. In fact, the expectation of the right to bring a nuisance 
suit, as well as the corollary expectation that a property owner may 
not create a nuisance, are so long-held and fundamental as to be con-
sidered background principles of property law.146 
 Assuming that a landowner could show that a nuisance is occur-
ring and thus demonstrate an infringement on her right to use and 
enjoy, a property-rule remedy—injunctive relief—was traditionally 
expected.147 In modern times, however, courts have held that a liabil-
ity-rule remedy is sufficient to vindicate the right to use and enjoy in 
certain situations.148 In nuisance cases where the offending use has 
sufficient social utility, for example, courts have allowed monetary 
damages in place of injunctive relief.149 Therefore, as against inter-
ference by private parties, the right to use and enjoy is usually pro-
tected by a property rule, though the court may substitute a liability 
rule in certain situations.150 
 On the other hand, when a government entity infringes on the 
right to use and enjoy, the Fifth Amendment takings doctrine impos-
es a liability-rule remedy. As discussed above, the court will apply 
the Penn Central balancing test to determine if a restriction on the 
right to use and enjoy rises to the level of a taking, and if so, mone-
tary compensation is due. For example, Penn Central itself dealt with 
a restriction on the right to use property, ultimately concluding that 
a limitation on development above Grand Central Station did not 
amount to a taking of property. Lucas also considered a limit on the 
right to use property, holding that a regulation completely foreclosing 
development and removing all value from a property was a per se 
taking and awarding monetary damages to vindicate the infringe-
ment on the right to use. 
 Thus property owners can seek to protect their right to use and 
enjoy either through a nuisance action, as against a private party, or 
a takings claim, as against a government entity. While in both in-
stances courts employ a balancing test to determine whether there is 
a compensable infringement on the right to use and enjoy, regardless 
of the result of the balancing, an important property expectation is 
the ability to seek vindication of these rights in court. Further, if a 
 146. Robin Kundis Craig, Public Trust and Public Necessity Defenses to Takings Liabil-
ity for Sea Level Rise Responses on the Gulf Coast, 26 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 395, 402 
(2011). 
 147. See, e.g., Boomer v. Atlantic Cement Co., 257 N.E.2d 870 (N.Y. 1970). 
 148. Id. at 875. 
 149. See id. at 872-75. 
 150. See generally id. 
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property owner succeeds in either of these claims, the right to use 
and enjoy is protected by at least a liability rule. 
C.   Conflicts Between Aggressive Renewable Energy Policies           
and Property Expectations 
 Aggressive policies to encourage renewable energy, whether 
through mandates or limitations on neighbors’ ability to interfere 
with renewables projects, create tension with expectations and reme-
dies regarding the right to exclude and the right to use and enjoy. 
Specifically, these policies can conflict with expectations by altering 
remedies from property rules to liability rules or by instituting no-
liability rules. By altering these remedy expectations, these policies 
effectively alter property owners’ substantive rights to exclude and 
rights to use and enjoy, and they breed legal challenges, particularly 
in the form of takings claims.   
 For example, policies mandating distributed generation or mi-
crogrid installation151 run up against expectations regarding the right 
to exclude and the right to use and enjoy because such mandates, to 
the extent that they do not provide for compensation,152 impose a    
no-liability rule for infringements of these rights. A property owner 
who is compelled to install solar panels or windmills or to join a     
microgrid may object that this physically invades her property or lim-
its her right to use and enjoy it. Moreover, the property owner’s ar-
gument will be even stronger if a policy requires her to install com-
monly owned or third-party-owned equipment on her property.153 
Normally the property owner could expect property-rule protection 
(via trespass) against the third party’s encroachment, and to the ex-
tent that the government compelled such invasion, the property own-
er would expect at least liability-rule protection through a takings 
claim. Indeed, multiple scholars have suggested that while govern-
ment policies mandating renewables would effectively advance re-
newables productivity, distributed generation installation, and mi-
crogrid development,154 takings claims represent a major impediment 
to these policies.155   
 Furthermore, policies that limit neighbors’ rights to challenge or 
interfere with renewable energy projects also create tensions with 
 151. See discussion supra Part II.C.1. 
 152. These proposals do not provide for compensation likely because they would become 
impossibly expensive. 
 153. See Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 435 (1982) 
(stressing that a third-party physical invasion occasions a taking); see also Bronin, supra 
note 7, at 583. 
 154. See supra Part II.C.1. 
 155. Bronin, supra note 7, at 583. 
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the right to use and enjoy. For example, laws precluding nuisance 
suits against windmills or solar installations156 alter a neighbor’s ex-
pectation in asserting her right to use and enjoy the property. Simi-
larly, solar- or wind-rights regimes that prohibit certain activities, 
such as installing structures that might shade a solar collector or in-
terfere with wind passage, also limit exercise of rights to use and enjoy.   
 While the neighbor’s expectations regarding the right to use and 
enjoy may be malleable and subject to a balancing test, a real and 
important component of this expectation includes both the ability to 
bring a legal challenge determining whether the right has been in-
fringed and the possibility of receiving a remedy vindicating that 
right. Laws that preclude such legal challenges ex ante, however, con-
flict with that expectation. By removing the ability to bring a suit, 
these policies take away the possibility of a landowner receiving ei-
ther a property-rule or liability-rule protection of the right. Instead, 
these policies institute a de facto no-liability rule (if a neighbor can-
not challenge an action, she is assured of getting no remedy). Again, 
scholars have noted that to the extent such government policies in-
terfere with property owners’ expectations regarding their rights and 
remedies in the use and enjoyment of their property, takings claims 
are likely to ensue.157    
IV.   THE ENERGY/PROPERTY BALANCE:  
DIMINISHED PROPERTY EXPECTATIONS IN THE ENERGY CONTEXT 
 Aggressive efforts to promote clean energy are not the first set of 
energy-production measures to run up against core property expecta-
tions like the right to exclude and the right to use and enjoy. Rather, 
many past energy policies and doctrines have altered rights and rem-
edies for these fundamental property expectations, and legislatures 
and courts have consistently compromised property expectations in 
the face of energy needs. This Part recounts that tradition of com-
promise and describes the long history of decreased property expecta-
tions when energy development or production is at stake. Based on 
the importance of developing energy resources, legislatures and 
courts have recognized an energy/property balance whereby property 
expectations give way to energy production.  
 In demonstrating this energy/property balance, this Part recounts 
treatment of pre-electrical energy sources, electricity production and 
 156. See discussion supra Part II.C.2. 
 157. Bronin, supra note 101, at 82 (“[A] court might find that a regulatory taking was 
effected on a property owner whose ability to infringe on her neighbors’ solar access was 
unexpectedly eliminated by the adoption of the preexisting restrictions proposal because 
the character of the restriction was far-reaching and reduced her property’s resale value, 
and because the property owner purchased the property with the expectation that she 
would not have such a restriction.”). 
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provision via water, coal, and utilities, oil and gas production, and 
even farming production.   
A.   Pre-Electrical Energy Sources: Firewood and Water 
 Even from the earliest moments in American history, when energy 
production was more primitive, courts and legislatures curtailed 
property expectations to strike an energy/property balance. For ex-
ample, in colonial times a property holder’s right to exclude was lim-
ited to accommodate neighbors’ energy needs; neighbors had rights 
over adjoining landowners to hunt and gather wood—both crucial 
sources of energy at the time.158 In fact, in a major blow to the right 
to exclude, a generally held right to hunt on unenclosed land was 
paramount even to a landowner’s express demand to the contrary.159 
The normal law of trespass simply did not apply in this context, and 
the right to exclude that was normally protected by a property-rule 
remedy was not even protected by a liability rule. Rather, a no-
liability rule meant that it was not protected at all in this context. 
 Additionally, the need to gather firewood for energy overcame the 
otherwise rigid law of waste that governed a tenant’s right to use 
land.160 Under the English law of waste that first governed the Amer-
ican colonies, a landlord could expect that his tenant would return 
the property to him unchanged, and a major application of this doc-
trine was to preclude the clearing of forests or cutting of wood.161 This 
restriction protected the landlord’s (or other future interest holder’s) 
expectation in the right to use and enjoy that resource in the future, 
and since the landlord could enjoin his tenant from committing 
waste, this expectation was protected by a property rule. However, 
one of the few exceptions to this English law of waste was that “ten-
ants could take from the land . . . the timber that was necessary for 
maintaining buildings, making tools, and warming themselves in 
winter, called respectively ‘house bote,’ ‘tool bote,’ and ‘fire bote.’ ”162 
Hence, one of the few default exceptions to the landlord’s expectation, 
the fire bote, was in the interest of energy production, and while the 
landlord normally enjoyed property-rule protection to enjoin a tenant 
 158. FRED BOSSELMAN ET AL., ENERGY, ECONOMICS AND THE ENVIRONMENT 169 (3d ed. 
2010) (“Ever since prehistoric humans discovered how to make fire they have been cutting 
down trees to obtain wood as a fuel. Wood . . . continued to be the dominant source of ener-
gy until the mid-nineteenth century.”); Williams, supra note 106, at 282 (“An owner’s 
neighbors also had substantial rights over his land—including the right to hunt, gather 
wood, graze animals, pass over, and use water from his land—many of which were carried 
over to the colonies and persisted well into the nineteenth century.”).  
 159. McConico v. Singleton, 9 S.C.L. (1 Mill) 244 (S.C. Ct. App. 1818). 
 160. See Jedediah Purdy, The American Transformation of Waste Doctrine: A Pluralist 
Interpretation, 91 CORNELL L. REV. 653, 658 (2006). 
 161. Id. at 662-63. 
 162. Id. at 663. 
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from waste, the fire bote created a no-liability rule in the case of 
firewood energy production.  
 Like the gathering and burning of firewood, the use of water for 
direct kinetic energy occasioned a similar energy/property balance. 
Well before water was harnessed to generate electricity, it was an 
important energy source in driving water mills that powered facto-
ries in both England and America,163 and such mills were common in 
America from the time of the colonies until after the 1850s.164 Dam 
construction ensured continuous water power for these mills, but the 
dams also led to flooding and consequently to property conflicts be-
tween mill owners and their aggrieved neighbors.165 To resolve such 
conflicts in favor of continued waterpower, state legislatures passed 
“mill acts,” which curtailed neighbors’ ability to challenge the mills 
under common law property theories and instead provided the exclu-
sive remedy for flooding.166 For example, a 1795 Massachusetts stat-
ute allowed mill owners “to raise a dam and flood the land of his 
neighbor, so long as he compensated him according to the procedures 
established by the act.”167 Typically such mill acts allowed neighbors 
to receive only yearly damages for even permanent flooding.168 Im-
portantly, the acts also forced neighbors to forego more advantageous 
common law property remedies. For example, the acts disallowed 
neighbors from bringing trespass actions and thus foreclosed the op-
portunity for neighbors to enjoin the flooding.169 In doing so, the acts 
replaced the long-held property-rule expectations with mere liability-
rule damages, even when the flooding caused permanent physical 
invasion.170 Moreover, the acts not only removed the possibility of 
punitive damages but also allowed a mill owner to escape all liability 
if he could show that the dam benefitted the neighbor on the bal-
ance.171 As a result, under certain scenarios the acts further dimin-
ished the protection of the right to exclude from a liability-rule reme-
dy to a no-liability rule.  
 163. BOSSELMAN ET AL., supra note 158, at 117-18. 
 164. Id. at 118. 
 165. Id. 
 166. MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW 1780–1860, at 47 
(1977). 
 167. Id. at 48. 
 168. Id.   
 169. Id.   
 170. See id. at 48. Permanent physical trespass or repeated trespass have traditionally 
been remedied with property-rule injunction. E.g., MERRILL & SMITH, supra note 142, at 
44-57 (discussing Baker v. Howard Cnty. Hunt, 188 A. 223 (Md. 1936), and Pile v. Pedrick, 
31 A. 647 (Pa. 1895)). 
 171. HORWITZ, supra note 166, at 48. 
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 In applying and justifying these acts, courts directly acknowledged 
the compromise of property expectations in favor of important energy 
resources. The Massachusetts Supreme Court noted that the acts 
were “at variance with that absolute right of dominion and enjoy-
ment which every proprietor is supposed by law to have in his own 
soil.”172 Nonetheless, the court justified the act’s adjustment of prop-
erty expectations based on the social importance of the mills as ener-
gy resources.173 The court further reasoned that the physical location 
of the neighbors’ land on watercourses meant that the neighbors’ 
property expectation must bow to the common good of efficient ener-
gy production, stressing that the acts were “designed to provide for 
the most useful and beneficial occupation and enjoyment of natural 
streams and water-courses, where the absolute right of each proprie-
tor, to use his own land and water privileges, at his own pleasure, 
cannot be fully enjoyed, and one must of necessity, in some degree, 
yield to the other.”174   
 The mill acts offer an early example not only of the energy/property 
balance limiting property expectations but also of courts and legisla-
tures specifically adjusting the expectations of property owners phys-
ically located on or near desirable energy resources. As Morton Hor-
witz describes, these acts “offer some of the earliest illustrations of 
American willingness to sacrifice the sanctity of private property in 
the interest of promoting economic development”175 and demonstrate 
that “a conception of absolute and exclusive dominion over property 
was incompatible with the needs of industrial development.”176 In the 
mill acts, legislatures and courts recognized that waterpower was too 
important an energy resource to yield to neighboring property own-
ers’ subjective values or inclination to hold out from cooperating. Ac-
cordingly, the legislatures and courts reshaped property expectations 
to accommodate energy development. 
B.   Electricity Production and Provision: Water, Coal, and Utilities 
 As our primary energy base shifted to electricity,177 legislatures 
and courts again diminished expectations in the right to exclude and 
the right to use and enjoy to facilitate electrical production and dis-
tribution. As coal became an important energy resource, first for 
smaller in-home and early industrial uses and later for large-scale 
 172. Fiske v. Framingham Mfg. Co., 29 Mass. (1 Pick.) 68, 70 (1831). 
 173. Id. at 70-71. 
 174. Id. at 71. 
 175. HORWITZ, supra note 166, at 47. 
 176. Id.  
 177. See generally Pursley & Wiseman, supra note 1, at 884-86 (outlining the develop-
ment of electricity as the nation’s primary energy source). 
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production of electricity, lawmakers and courts repeatedly relied on 
the energy/property balance to facilitate coal production. For exam-
ple, in 1886 the Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that a private 
property owner was entitled to neither an injunction nor even dam-
ages for water pollution caused by a neighboring coal mine,178 thereby 
imposing a no-liability rule in place of property-rule or at least liabil-
ity-rule expectations. The court offered the same energy/property 
balance reasoning used to justify the mill acts, holding that “mere 
private personal inconveniences . . . must yield to the necessities of a 
great public industry, which, although in the hands of a private cor-
poration, subserves a great public interest. To encourage the devel-
opment of the great natural resources of a country trifling inconven-
iences to particular persons must sometimes give way to the necessi-
ties of a great community.”179   
 Courts continued to apply the energy/property balance to foster 
coal production with the advent of new mining techniques. For ex-
ample, in the 1950s, when surface mining180 began to replace under-
ground mining as the prevalent form of coal extraction, conflicts 
arose because the surface mining interfered with the surface owners’ 
right to exclude and right to use and enjoy the land in ways that un-
derground mining had not. Though the surface mining techniques 
and impacts were not foreseen at the time the surface owners grant-
ed away their mineral rights, courts initially interpreted the mineral-
rights grants to mean that the surface owners could not prevent min-
eral-rights holders from surface mining.181 Similarly, when under-
ground coal mining shifted to the “longwall” technique that led to in-
creased and immediate subsidence of surface estates, West Virginia 
courts ruled that the change in technique did not impact the right of 
subadjacent support.182 These rulings demonstrate “the attitude 
prevalent in the nineteenth century—that because coal was dramati-
cally increasing peoples’ ability to produce goods and raise their 
standard of living, the law ought to construe instruments in a way 
that encouraged the production of this valuable commodity.”183 In 
 178. Pa. Coal Co. v. Sanderson, 6 A. 453 (Pa. 1886). 
 179. Id. at 459. 
 180. Surface mining is also referred to as strip mining. In coal production, estates are 
often split between the surface estate and the mineral estate. Klass, supra note 90, at 685 
(“Much of the land in the Interior West is in “split-estate” ownership, meaning one party 
owns the surface rights of the land and another party owns the subsurface and mineral 
rights.”).   
 181. BOSSELMAN ET AL., supra note 158, at 201. In fact, when the Kentucky legislature 
tried to limit surface mining by limiting mineral-rights holders to using techniques com-
mon at the time the mineral deeds were executed, the Kentucky Supreme Court invalidat-
ed the statute, and a constitutional amendment was enacted to change the practice. See id. 
 182. See id. at 202. 
 183. Id. 
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both situations, the courts again adjusted surface-rights owners’ ex-
pectations to favor energy production by instituting a no-liability 
scheme instead of protecting the right to exclude and the right to use 
and enjoy with a property-rule or liability-rule remedy. 
 The development of hydropower also saw private property yield in 
service of energy production. However, unlike the examples discussed 
above, which utilized no-liability rules to advance energy develop-
ment, hydropower developed through the use of liability rules.184 Spe-
cifically, hydropower projects relied heavily on eminent domain au-
thority exercised by federal entities like the Tennessee Valley Au-
thority (“TVA”) and Bonneville Power Authority (“BPA”).185 The hy-
droelectric dams created by the TVA and the BPA “displaced thou-
sands of people, but the promised economic benefits of the new tech-
nology were so great that the minor hardship [of those compensated 
to move] was widely seen as simply the price of progress.”186 While a 
government’s exercise of eminent domain power does not truly alter 
property expectations,187 the rationale for the TVA’s and BPA’s emi-
nent domain authority reflects the same concepts underlying the en-
ergy/property balance: that private property must make way for en-
ergy development, especially when new technologies make production 
more efficient.  
 More noteworthy than the government’s use of eminent domain 
authority to install hydropower facilities is the government’s grant-
ing private entities eminent domain authority to facilitate energy de-
velopment. Such grants represent another example of the ener-
gy/property balance shaping property expectations by changing the 
remedy for third-party interference from a property-rule scheme to a 
liability-rule scheme. For example, some state legislatures “have giv-
en broad authority to natural resource developers to exercise the 
power of eminent domain directly to promote development of coal, oil, 
gas, and other state natural resources.”188 Importantly, these grants 
of eminent domain power differ materially from the standard con-
demnation authority given to private entities. As Alexandra Klass 
has observed, unlike the more common state grants of eminent do-
main power to railroads, power companies, or other common carriers 
 184. Interestingly, also unlike the examples discussed above, hydropower projects were 
generally undertaken by the government as opposed to private parties. 
 185. Robert L. Bradley, Jr., The Origins of Political Electricity: Market Failure or Polit-
ical Opportunism?, 17 ENERGY L.J. 59, 94-99 (1996). 
 186. BOSSELMAN ET AL., supra note 158, at 125. 
 187. As noted earlier, the rights to exclude and to use and enjoy only receive liability-
rule protection against government intrusion. 
 188. Klass, supra note 90, at 652; see also id. at 659 (“Statutes in Arizona, Colorado, 
Idaho, Montana, Nevada, North Dakota, Oklahoma, South Dakota, Utah, and Wyoming 
specifically grant eminent domain authority to private companies in connection with min-
ing, oil and gas, and other natural resource development.”).  
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for “use by the public,” eminent domain power exercised by private 
energy developers “will not be subject to public access or public use 
and is only ‘public’ in the sense that the resource development will 
add to the growth of the overall state economy.”189 
 This private eminent domain power is another example of legisla-
tures striking the energy/property balance to promote develop-
ment,190 and courts have upheld these measures based on the im-
portance of energy production. For example, in 1979 the Wyoming 
Supreme Court interpreted a statute granting private eminent      
domain power for “mining” to include authority for a private oil com-
pany to condemn land for oil and gas exploration and develop-
ment.191 The court justified its decision in part on the “great public 
interest in an imminent need for energy.”192 Under similar justifica-
tions, “federal law and the law in many states expressly delegates the 
power of eminent domain to power companies and oil and gas compa-
nies for the construction of electric transmission lines and oil and          
gas pipelines.”193 
 In the same vein, the legal treatment of public utilities reflects the 
prioritization of energy’s social values over private property expecta-
tions. Historically, as private property rights in electrical production 
and distribution infrastructure led to natural monopolies, the indus-
try was regulated and certain rights were restricted because of the 
overarching social importance of electrical energy. Thus previously 
private utility property was pushed into a “partly public, partly pri-
vate status.”194 Ratemaking replaced a purely property-rights-based 
market, and the duty to serve customers replaced any right to ex-
clude individuals from service. Moreover, this was all done under a 
no-liability framework. Government regulators pressed utilities’ 
property interests into public service, but courts did not find this to 
be a compensable taking so long as the rates set were not so low as to 
be unjust, which was the case even when rates did not allow for com-
 189. Id. at 659. 
 190. Id. at 661 (“Whenever eminent domain is authorized, it is a statement by a gov-
ernment authority that it wishes to promote the public interest through reallocation of 
property rights in a context where it does not trust the market to reach an optimal result. 
These statutes and constitutional provisions in the Interior West exist as a reflection of the 
desire of these states to use their property laws to promote particular forms of economic 
growth without interference from other private property interests.” (footnote omitted)). 
 191. Coronado Oil Co. v. Grieves, 603 P.2d 406 (Wyo. 1979). 
 192. Id. at 411; see also Klass, supra note 90, at 665. 
 193. Klass, supra note 90, at 675. 
 194. Duquesne Light Co. v. Barasch, 488 U.S. 299, 307 (1989); see also id. (“Although 
their assets are employed in the public interest to provide consumers of the State with 
electric power, they are owned and operated by private investors.”). 
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plete or timely recoupment of expenditures.195 Moreover, despite the 
fact that most utilities are privately owned, regulators can mandate a 
minimum level of equipment and maximum level of output.196 Regu-
lators can require sufficient plant capacity to service peak load, even 
if it is rarely used, or they can require certain providers to stop send-
ing energy to the grid in instances of overproduction.197 Under other 
circumstances, such interference with the right to exclude or the 
right to use private property would at least give rise to a claim for 
compensation, but under the energy/property balance, “the public-
private nature of shared energy”198 allows the government to regulate 
with a heavier hand without incurring compensation liability. 
C.   Oil and Gas Production 
 From their origins to the present day, oil and gas doctrines in the 
United States also demonstrate how the energy/property balance af-
fects property expectations. As a leading treatise has put it, “While 
oil and gas have been justifiably regarded as private property in eve-
ry state where discovered, their production, storage, and transporta-
tion have always been treated as being affected by public interest.”199 
In light of these public interest concerns, states have mandated con-
servation measures to encourage production and avoid waste of oil 
and gas resources, and such measures include the nearly ubiquitous 
state laws requiring compulsory pooling,200 compulsory unitization, 
and pipeline regulation. As discussed in detail below, each of these 
measures alters expectations of the right to exclude or the right to 
use and enjoy, but all have withstood takings analysis based on the 
concept “that the private property rights of a mineral owner could be 
constitutionally limited for the purpose of conserving the resource for 
 195. See Duquesne Light Co., 488 U.S. 209 (holding that a Pennsylvania law preventing 
electricity providers from setting utility rates to reflect investments in as-yet-unused plant 
did not violate the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment). 
 196. See, e.g., Janice A. Beecher, Economic Regulation of Utility Infrastructure, in 
INFRASTRUCTURE AND LAND POLICIES 87, 88, 91-93, 102, 105, 108 (2013), available at 
http://ipu.msu.edu/research/pdfs/Beecher%20Economic%20Regulation%20of%20Infrastruct
ure%20Lincoln%202013.pdf. 
 197. Id. at 92-93; Ted Sickinger, Too Much of a Good Thing: Growth in Wind Power 
Makes Life Difficult for Grid Managers, OR. LIVE (July 17, 2010), 
http://www.oregonlive.com/business/index.ssf/2010/07/too_much_of_a_good_thing_growt.ht
ml (discussing curtailments of renewable energy production when spikes in generation 
could overwhelm energy grids); Peaking Power Plants, WIS. PUB. SERV.,  
http://www.wisconsinpublicservice.com/company/peaking.aspx (last visited Mar. 4, 2014) 
(discussing peaking power plants). 
 198. Bronin, supra note 7, at 547. 
 199. KRAMER & MARTIN, supra note 62, § 3.02. 
 200. Id. § 3.02[1], [2] (“Compulsory pooling statutes exist today in all major producing 
states except Kansas. . . . Compulsory unitization statutes were enacted in many of the 
major oil-producing states during the 1950’s, so that today only Texas remains without a 
compulsory unitization process.”). 
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the public benefit.”201 Thus, just as in other energy contexts, legisla-
tures and courts have employed the energy/property balance to pro-
mote oil and gas development by instituting no-liability rules for oth-
erwise compensable infringements on the right to exclude or the right 
to use and enjoy. 
 As a baseline for examining these oil and gas conservation 
measures, it is worth quickly reviewing the law of capture and cor-
relative rights principles that underlie oil and gas law. In defining 
ownership of oil and gas resources, states universally adopted the 
rule of capture, which provides that “the owner of a tract of land ac-
quires title to the oil and gas that is produced from wells drilled on 
the tract even if it can be shown that the oil or gas migrated from ad-
joining lands.”202 Consequently, if a tract owner can pump it, he owns 
it, regardless of whether the oil or gas comes from under his land or 
his neighbor’s.203 This concept itself reflects a version of the ener-
gy/property balance because it encourages energy production via a 
no-liability rule for draining oil or gas from under a neighbor’s 
tract.204 Under the rule of capture, the only option to protect your oil 
and gas from your neighbor is to drill your own well and intercept the 
oil and gas before it is drained away.205   
 However, this rule of capture scheme causes two major problems: 
overdrilling—too many wells drilled creating a higher capital cost 
than necessary to drain the oil and gas reserve—and premature dis-
 201. Id. § 3.02. 
 202. Id. at ch. 2 Scope.  
 203. Often surface and mineral rights are severed; however, this does not change the 
analysis of the balance between neighboring property rights holders. Nonetheless, it is 
worth noting the legal relationship when land is divided into “ ‘split estate’ ownership, 
meaning one party owns the surface rights of [a tract] and another party owns the subsur-
face and mineral rights” underlying the tract, which demonstrates another example of 
property expectations adjusted in favor of energy development such as mining or oil and 
gas. Klass, supra note 90, at 685.  
  “Until recently, the law had been fairly settled with regard to the rights of mineral 
owners and surface owners. As a matter of common law, the mineral estate was the ‘domi-
nant’ estate and the mineral owner had the right to use that portion of the surface estate 
reasonably necessary to develop the severed mineral interests. In addition, the owner of 
the mineral right was not liable for surface damage in the absence of negligence unless 
there was a contractual agreement to pay damages or a statute providing a right to dam-
ages. Moreover, any recoverable damages often were limited to damages to ‘crops’ and ‘im-
provements’ and did not include damages to natural vegetation, non-agricultural buildings, 
or general loss of land value.” Id. at 686 (footnote omitted). Thus the common law expecta-
tion favored energy production, and while some states have passed statutes requiring min-
eral owners to make accommodations such as requiring advanced written notice to access 
private lands for oil and gas operations or requiring agreements for surface use, the back-
ground property expectation remains that the mineral owner, with its interest in energy 
production, has the dominant interest. See id. at 686-87. 
 204. See KRAMER & MARTIN, supra note 62, § 2.01 (describing the rule of capture as a 
“non-liability” rule). 
 205. See id. 
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sipation of the natural reservoir energy—that is, dissipation of the 
pressure that would naturally push the oil and gas up the wellhead, 
ultimately leading to a higher cost of production and inability to pro-
duce as much of the oil and gas in the reservoir.206 In response to 
these problems, state legislatures developed conservation regulations 
to prevent physical and economic waste of oil and gas and to protect 
tract holders’ correlative rights to produce their fair share of the en-
ergy resources under their land.207 Central to these conservation reg-
ulations was the concept of well spacing for efficient drainage of oil 
and gas reservoirs; by regulating spacing, conservation agencies can 
regulate the number of wells over a reservoir and thereby prevent 
overdrilling and premature dissipation.208 However, since reservoir 
shapes and spacing requirements do not necessarily track surface-
property boundaries, conservation measures frequently operate 
across property lines and thus create tension with the right to ex-
clude and the right to use.  
 Compulsory pooling offers a prime example of a legislatively en-
acted conservation measure curtailing the right to exclude. Most ba-
sically, pooling is cooperation by separate entities in a single well; it 
involves combining property interests in separate tracts of land that 
will all most efficiently be drained by a single well, regardless of dif-
fering ownership across property lines.209 The separate tracts all con-
tribute to the production cost of the well and share in the proceeds.210   
 Pooling can be voluntary, which raises no affront to the right to 
exclude or the right to use and enjoy, but when parties do not volun-
tarily agree to pool interests, state statutes can force certain tracts—
usually small or irregularly sized ones—to pool.211 Such compulsion 
infringes on the right to exclude and the right to use and enjoy be-
cause owners may be forced into a pool and thus forced to exploit 
mineral resources that they do not wish to exploit. If a tract is part of 
a pool, its minerals will be drained; the owner cannot choose to wait 
to use those resources at a later date or to not use them at all. While 
the tract owner is paid for the value of her share of the drained min-
erals, she receives no compensation for giving up her choice about 
whether to drain them. Under this no-liability rule, the tract owner 
effectively loses the right to exclude and the right to use and enjoy.   
 206. Id. § 2.02.   
 207. Id. 
 208. Id. § 3.02[4][b]. 
 209. Id. § 6.01 (“A prerequisite of most pooling provisions is that there be two or more 
separately owned tracts or interests located within a spacing or drilling unit.”). 
 210. Id. More precisely, the working-interest owners share the production costs and all 
owners of rights in the minerals share the production. Id. 
 211. Id. 
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 Moreover, some states’ forced pooling regimes tread further on 
non-consenting owners’ expectations by not only forcing development 
of resources through compulsory pooling but also forcing non-
consenting owners to pay additional surcharges.212 In such states, 
non-consenters must not only pay their share of production costs out 
of their share of oil and gas, but they must also compensate the oper-
ator for the risk of drilling a non-profitable well.213 In these situa-
tions, there is double curtailment of property expectations; the non-
consenting owner not only loses her right to exclude mineral produc-
tion from her tract after it is pooled, but she also has to pay a premi-
um for choosing not to voluntarily enter the pool. As a result, not only 
has her right to exclude vanished into a no-liability scheme after the 
forced pooling occurs, but she also incurs a liability for using her 
right to exclude. With this additional surcharge, the property owner 
is fined for exercising her right to exclude even before the forced pool-
ing has gone into effect. This form of compulsory pooling turns a 
basic property expectation on its head: through a no-liability rule it 
effectively erases the right to exclude entirely, and then it charges a 
property owner for having attempted to exercise the right at all. 
 Compulsory unitization, which involves a similar concept to pool-
ing but on a grander scale, limits the right to exclude in the same 
way. While pooling focuses on the area that can be efficiently drained 
by a single well, unitization consolidates differing interests in a 
common supply (for example, consolidating the interests in an entire 
oil field) to maximize production efficiency.214 Thus a unitized area 
may include many pooled units.215 Again, like pooling, parties may 
voluntarily unitize and benefit from the efficiency gains.216 However, 
despite the economic advantages, such voluntary unitization rarely 
occurs due to coordination or holdout problems, so state legislatures 
have enacted compulsory unitization statutes to force non-consenting 
interests to unitize.217 Like in the pooling context, some states         
also impose unitization risk penalties, forcing non-consenting parties 
to pay more than their share of the cost of production.218 For ex-
ample, Tennessee imposes a risk penalty up to 350 percent.219 Just as 
 212. While some states allow for a “free rider” approach, where the non-consenting 
owners’ share of production costs is subtracted from their share of production, other states 
impose a risk penalty on non-consenters. Id. 
 213. Id. 
 214. Id. § 6.02. 
 215. Id. 
 216. Id. 
 217. Id. For compulsory unitization, statutes typically require at least a minimum per-
centage of interests to consent. Id. 
 218. Id.   
 219. TENN. COMP. R. & REGS. 0400-55-01-.01(1)(d) (2013). 
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with forced pooling, this penalty deals a double blow to the right      
to exclude. 
 In addition to curtailing the conceptual right to exclude and right 
to use, compulsory pooling and unitization statutes also eliminate 
property owners’ rights to exclude physical entry or occupation         
of their property. Numerous physical invasions can arise when prop-
erties are pooled or unitized. For example, the optimal surface or  
bottomhole220 location of a well may require physical invasion of a 
tract that has been forced into the pooling or unitization (i.e., has not 
consented to either draining oil or physical invasion) or on a tract 
that has voluntarily joined the pool for purposes of draining its oil 
but has not otherwise agreed to surface or subsurface physical inva-
sion.221 Alternatively, even if the surface well or bottomhole is not 
located on one of these non-consenting tracts, the oil or gas produc-
tion operations may still physically invade the non-consenting land 
for access or production-related activities.222 In such instances, courts 
frequently find uncompensated, implied easements over the non-
consenting land for production activities because the purpose of the 
pooling and unitization would otherwise be defeated.223 Hence, even 
though the well operator would be physically trespassing on the non-
consenting land in the absence of the unitization or pooling statutes, 
courts have held that there is no trespass under the unitization or 
pooling schemes.224   
 In sum, through unitization and pooling, legislatures and courts 
have eliminated expectations that the right to exclude physical inva-
sions is protected by property rules or strict-liability per se taking 
 220. “Bottomhole” refers to “[t]he lowest or deepest part of a well.” 8-B WILLIAMS & 
MEYERS, OIL AND GAS LAW, B Terms (2013). One can think of this as the furthest physical 
extent of the well. 
 221. 2 KRAMER & MARTIN, supra note 62, § 20.06[1] (“The optimum surface or bottom-
hole location of the unit well might be on the land of an unleased owner or an owner who 
has not consented to pooling or unitization.”).   
 222. Id. (“There may be need for use of land within a unit for access to the unit well 
and for production related activities ranging from treatment plants to oil tanks to gather-
ing lines.”).   
 223. Id. (“If a unit operator is unable to gain access to and unable to use the land for 
unit operations . . . the purposes sought to be attained by the state conservation order may 
be defeated. Pooling and unitization are generally favored, so it is not surprising that the 
courts frequently find that there is an implied easement to use the land for unit operations 
. . . or that an order of the conservation agency gives the right of use for unit operations.”). 
 224. Id. (“The question arises, however, whether the unit operator will be able to make 
use of the land of an unleased owner whose interest has been included in the unit and will 
share in the production from the unit well. Unless the unit order provides a defense, use of 
the surface or subsurface would be a trespass. . . . The courts that have ruled on this issue 
have concluded that the unit order will prevent the unit operations from constituting a 
trespass.”); see also id. (“The cases that have taken up the implied rights issue have almost 
uniformly concluded that the mineral rights owner may use the lands for unit activities 
whether the unit well was on or off the land burdened by the mineral interest.”). 
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rules. Instead, they have installed no-liability rules. State legisla-
tures require not only that non-consenting landowners submit to de-
velopment of their oil-and-gas resources but also that landowners 
endure physical invasion of the surface of their land225 or of the sub-
surface.226 As long as the physical invasion is done for oil and gas 
production227 under the pooling or unitization scheme,228 no compen-
sation is owed for the physical incursion or use of the land,229 and 
 225. For example, New Mexico recognizes rights of well operators to enter and use the 
surface or land within a unit even when not part of the operator’s lease; however, it does 
not extend the same protection to non-unitized portions of the same tract, where such entry 
would be trespass. Kysar v. Amoco Prod. Co., 93 P.3d 1272, 1282 (N.M. 2004) (“We hold 
that under New Mexico law a mineral lessee’s implied surface right of reasonable ingress 
and egress to reach a well located inside the production unit that the lessee is operating 
pursuant to a pooling arrangement extends across lease boundaries within the unit to the 
surface of the entire area subject to the arrangement, regardless of where within the unit 
production is taking place.”); id. at 1273 (“[A] mineral rights lessee does not, by virtue of 
having entered into a communitization agreement with the permission of the prior fee 
owner, enjoy a right of access over the surface estate of the portion of the leased area that 
is not subject to the agreement.”). 
 226. Moreover, most states that produce oil and gas find that physical invasion of the 
subsurface of the land is not a trespass. For example, “the North Dakota Supreme Court 
has joined the other producing states [sic] courts that have ruled that when a unit operator 
has drilled the unit well in accordance with the orders and regulations of the state conser-
vation agency, the agency authorization will preclude a suit by the landowner in trespass, 
even though the well bore may enter the landowner’s property at a subsurface location.” 2 
KRAMER & MARTIN, supra note 62, § 20.06[1][f] (citing Cont’l Res., Inc. v. Farrar Oil Co., 
559 N.W.2d 841 (1997)). The North Dakota court was clear that even though the tract was 
forced-pooled and suffered a subsurface physical invasion, that did not amount to trespass 
or a compensable claim because the forced pooling statute superseded such property law 
principles. Id. (“[The] forced pooling order was a proper exercise of the state’s police power 
that superseded the property law of trespass. So long as Continental complied with the 
rules and regulations of the Industrial Commission in drilling the well, the forced pooling 
order would preclude any claim by Farrar against Continental for a subsurface trespass 
even though the horizontal hole would transect much of Farrar’s leased formation in the 
southwest quarter. The court stated that ‘property law is necessarily superseded’ by the 
Resources Act under which the pooling was undertaken, and to hold otherwise would ‘frus-
trate the purposes of the North Dakota Resources Act and would make an Industrial 
Commission’s forced pooling order ineffectual.’ ” (quoting Cont’l Res., 559 N.W.2d at 846)). 
 227. When such invasions have not been pursuant to oil and gas production, the courts 
have not allowed the incursions without the payment of damages. Despite finding such an 
implied usage right for oil and gas production on unitized tracts, though, a New Mexico 
appeals court did not find an implied easement for a groundwater pollution monitoring 
well associated with the oil and gas extraction. See Smith & Marrs, Inc. v. Osborn, 180 
P.3d 1183 (N.M. Ct. App. 2008). 
 228. Incursions to land for non-production reasons or to non-unitized tracts receive no 
such immunity See Kysar, 93 P.3d at 1282 (“We hold that under New Mexico law a mineral 
lessee’s implied surface right of reasonable ingress and egress to reach a well located inside 
the production unit that the lessee is operating pursuant to a pooling arrangement extends 
across lease boundaries within the unit to the surface of the entire area subject to the ar-
rangement, regardless of where within the unit production is taking place.”); id. at 1273 
(“[A] mineral rights lessee does not, by virtue of having entered into a communitization 
agreement with the permission of the prior fee owner, enjoy a right of access over the sur-
face estate of the portion of the leased area that is not subject to the agreement.”).  
 229. The only case that implies compensation is due for the mere use of land without 
damages is Cormack v. Wil-Mc Corp., 661 P.2d 525 (Okla. 1983), but, as addressed in the 
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even if there is physical damage to the property, the nonconsenting 
landowner will only be compensated to the extent that she can prove 
actual surface damages.230 The right to exclude goes unprotected, and 
next footnote, that analysis is grounded in the idea of surface damages rather than the 
right to exclude or takings, and the case has since been superseded by Oklahoma’s surface 
damages act, which again focuses on damages rather than compensation for use. See 1 
WILLIAMS & MEYERS, supra note 220, § 218.   
 230. For example, the Louisiana Supreme Court has “held the enactment of conserva-
tion regulation statutes superseded the general concept of ownership of the subsurface of 
land. When a unit has been created by order of the Commissioner of Conservation, a legally 
actionable trespass has not occurred by the operator who drills the well.” 2 KRAMER & 
MARTIN, supra note 62, § 20.06[1][d] (citing Nunez v. Wainoco Oil & Gas Co., 488 So. 2d 
955 (La. 1986)). In a footnote in that case, the court observed that damages might be re-
quired if they could be proven, but held nothing was due to the owner because there were 
no observable surface consequences of the physical invasion two miles below the surface. 
See Nunez, 488 So. 2d at 964-65 n.29. Thus the court did not require compensation for the 
physical invasion but instead tied it to the showing of actual damages. A subsequent case 
in federal district court in Louisiana observed that Nunez relied on “the precise nature of 
unitization, that is, the creation of correlative rights and the redefining of traditional prop-
erty lines, which justifies precluding an action in trespass.” Mongrue v. Monsanto Co., No. 
98-2531, 1999 WL 219774, at *14 (E.D. La. Apr. 9, 1999).    
  Similarly, “[t]he Oklahoma cases in general have recognized a power of the opera-
tor under a unit order to use land in connection with unit operations even when the owner 
has not consented to the use of the land.” 2 KRAMER & MARTIN, supra note 62, 
§ 20.06[1][d]. Oklahoma courts have dismissed suits challenging access to land for unit 
operations on the grounds that “[i]f plaintiff’s contentions [challenging access] were upheld, 
the whole intent and purpose of the unitization law could be defeated by one or more recal-
citrant surface owners within a unit area. As we interpret the law, the Unit Operator has 
the right to use any surface within the unit for the purpose of efficiently carrying out the 
approved unit plan, so long as such use is reasonable and not unduly burdensome to any 
particular surface area.” Nelson v. Texaco Inc., 525 P.2d 1263, 1266 (Okla. 1974) (citation 
omitted).  
  Additionally, while Oklahoma has ruled that a “force-pooled, unleased landowner 
has a legal right to damages for use of his land by the operator of the unit well,” this was 
not a takings or trespass claim but merely one for surface damage. 2 KRAMER & MARTIN, 
supra note 62, § 20.06[1][d]. Moreover, since that time, Oklahoma, as well as a number of 
other states, has “enacted surface damages acts requiring operators to compensate surface 
owners for loss of future use of the land, the market value of crops destroyed, and diminu-
tion in the value of the surface.” 1 WILLIAMS & MEYERS, supra note 220, § 218. Again, these 
statutes are not aimed at protecting or compensating for physical use or invasion but ra-
ther are designed to compensate for actual damage caused, and absent the statute, the 
surface owner would not even be able to recover for the actual damages, much less the 
physical invasion or trespass. But cf. id. § 218.11 (“Many contemporary leases and deeds 
contain express provision requiring the mineral owner or lessee to compensate the surface 
owner ‘for all damages done in said operation to the lands, trees, shrubs or to any struc-
ture, or to any livestock thereon.’ Such a provision may be of particular importance to a 
lessor who joins in a community lease or whose lease contains authority for pooling or unit-
ization, inasmuch as he may otherwise be unfairly dealt with if the well drilled under the 
community lease or pooling or unitization agreement is upon his land, in which event he 
will suffer all the surface damage and yet be entitled only to a proportionate share of the 
royalties.” (quoting Meyer v. Cox, 252 S.W.2d 207, 208 (Tex. Civ. App. 1952))); id. § 218.12 
(“An oil and gas lease or an instrument severing minerals from the surface may by express 
provision impose an obligation on the lessee or mineral owner to restore the condition of 
the premises after cessation of mineral operations.”); see also 2 KRAMER & MARTIN, supra 
note 62, § 20.06[1] (“Of course, there is a distinction between payment for damages to land 
and payment for use. However, loss of use and damage can closely approximate one anoth-
er . . . .”). The treatise authors also endorse a view that there should be compensation in 
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the only relief remaining is a common tort duty to reimburse for ac-
tual harm caused. 
 Comparing the results of forced pooling and unitization with cases 
discussed above in the context of typical property expectations fur-
ther illustrates the significance of the energy/property balance on 
property rights and remedies. For example, while mandatory instal-
lation of EPA’s water quality monitoring wells on private property 
constituted a physical taking, mandatory installation of third-party 
oil and gas production wells on private property is not a compensable 
taking under forced pooling and unitization schemes. In fact, New 
Mexico courts have ruled that compulsory installation of water moni-
toring wells to record pollution from oil and gas production requires 
compensation, while the compulsory drilling of the oil and gas pro-
duction wells under a unitization scheme does not.231 This side-by-
side comparison of typical property expectations versus energy/   
property balance expectations shows the stark difference.    
 Oil and gas pipeline regulation demonstrates a similar curtail-
ment of the right to exclude. Oil and gas fields—particularly those 
focused on natural gas production—can be at the mercy of pipelines 
that, as the only methods of conveying gas from the fields, hold mo-
nopsony232 power.233 To prevent pipeline owners from causing waste 
or inefficiency by failing to coordinate with other parties, strategical-
ly holding out for higher prices, or excluding certain interests out-
right,234 regulations require pipelines “to purchase and take ratably 
oil or gas from each well in a reservoir or on the purchaser’s pipeline 
either case, but the courts have yet to implement such a view. Id. (“The courts that have 
ruled on this issue have concluded that the unit order will prevent the unit operations from 
constituting a trespass. Nevertheless, damages should be available to the landowner      
who has been force-pooled and whose land has been used for unit activities. . . . [W]e be-
lieve compensation needs to be paid when the land is used without formal consent being 
provided.”). 
 231. See Smith & Marrs, Inc. v. Osborn, 180 P.3d 1183 (N.M. Ct. App. 2008). 
 232. See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1098 (9th ed. 2009) (“Monopsony [is defined as a] 
market situation in which one buyer controls the market . . . . ‘Monopsony is often thought 
of as the flip side of monopoly. A monopolist is a seller with no rivals; a monopsonist is a 
buyer with no rivals. A monopolist has power over price exercised by limiting output. A 
monopsonist also has power over price, but this power is exercised by limiting aggregate 
purchases. Monopsony injures efficient allocation by reducing the quantity of the input 
product or service below the efficient level.’ ” (quoting LAWRENCE A. SULLIVAN & WARREN 
S. GRIMES, THE LAW OF ANTITRUST: AN INTEGRATED HANDBOOK 137-38 (2000))). 
 233. See KRAMER & MARTIN, supra note 62, § 5.04[1]. 
 234. Id. (“Physical waste can occur, particularly in circumstances where the gas in 
question is associated gas, when a pipeline does not take ratably from a reservoir because 
an owner of a well in competition with other wells will find it necessary to flare natural gas 
in order to produce the oil. As a further measure for the prevention of physical waste, some 
states have not only required ratable taking but have established a priority of takes, so 
that a pipeline must take gas on its system so as to limit the necessity of flaring gas in 
order to produce oil or to take gas first from distressed wells or wells that would become 
uneconomic if the gas flow were to diminish.”). 
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system.”235 Thus the pipeline regulations expressly eliminate the 
pipeline owners’ right to exclude since the pipeline must not only 
transport but also purchase a third party’s oil or gas. Again, laws 
forcing a property owner to submit to physical invasion by a third 
party normally occasions a per se taking protected by a strict-liability 
rule, but pipeline regulations reduce this expectation to a no-liability 
rule for the physical invasion and even impose an obligation to pur-
chase the third party’s oil or gas. 
 Each of these oil-and-gas conservation measures has been chal-
lenged as a compensable taking of private property, and each has 
survived based on energy/property balance reasoning.236 In finding no 
compensable takings, courts have deferred to the states’ valid exer-
cise of the police power to prevent the waste of crucial energy re-
sources237 and have repeatedly held that “the private property rights 
of a mineral owner [can] be constitutionally limited for the purpose of 
conserving the resource for the public benefit.”238   
 Further, though most of these oil and gas conservation programs 
survived their constitutional challenges before the modern takings 
era,239 the manifestation of the energy/property balance in the oil and 
gas context has continuing effect and increasing relevance as frack-
ing assumes a more important role in the United States’ energy port-
folio.240 Fracking is a method of oil and gas extraction that involves 
 235. Id. 
 236. See Champlin Refining Co. v. Corp. Comm’n of Okla., 51 F.2d 823, 824-25, 838 
(W.D. Okla. 1931) (upholding prorationing measures); Palmer Oil Corp. v. Phillips Petrole-
um Co., 231 P.2d 997, 1004-05 (Okla. 1951) (upholding compulsory unitization statutes); 
Patterson v. Stanolind Oil & Gas Co., 77 P.2d 83, 95 (Okla. 1938) (upholding compulsory 
pooling statutes). Thus as a leading treatise has put it, “It is well beyond cavil that state 
conservation statutes will be upheld under a per se equal protection, taking, or due process 
argument.” 2 KRAMER & MARTIN, supra note 62, § 24.01. Moreover, in the limited instances 
where courts have found oil and gas conservation statutes to create as-applied takings, the 
courts focused on complete prohibitions on energy production that denied all economically 
valuable uses of lands and were not centered on a right-to-exclude analysis. See id. There-
fore, in the oil and gas context, the courts have found takings only when production is im-
peded but not when land boundaries are compromised to encourage production. 
 237. KRAMER & MARTIN, supra note 62, § 3.02. For example, in the leading case on the 
matter, Ohio Oil Co. v. Indiana, 177 U.S. 190 (1900), the United States Supreme Court 
emphasized that a state’s police power allowed it to prevent the waste of energy resources 
and allowed state legislatures to define property rights not to include wasteful extraction of 
the resources. Id. at 210-11. Similarly, in Champlin Refining Co. v. Corp. Commission of 
Oklahoma, 286 U.S. 210 (1932), the Court again recognized that the property interests in 
the capture of oil and gas did not encompass the right to waste hydrocarbons. Id. at 233-34. 
 238. KRAMER & MARTIN, supra note 62, § 3.02. 
 239. 2 id. § 24.01[2]. 
 240. See, e.g., Hannah Wiseman, Urban Energy, 40 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1793, 1795-97 
(2013) (noting that the vast quantities of oil and gas available through fracking techniques 
have set the United States “on track to be one of the world’s largest oil producers and         
a major exporter of natural gas, something few would have predicted only a few years   
earlier”). 
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drilling wells vertically down some distance, then turning horizontal-
ly to follow productive reservoirs; such wells may extend a great hor-
izontal distance across numerous property lines.241 As described 
above, while in other contexts this subsurface invasion would appear 
to be a trespass, if committed by a private entity, or a physical tak-
ing, if mandated by the government. However, in the energy context 
courts have held that it is not a compensable violation of property 
rights. As recently as 2008, the Texas Supreme Court reaffirmed that 
subsurface physical invasions from fracking fall under the same no-
liability scheme discussed above.242 From the earliest doctrines en-
couraging oil and gas development to the most recent contests over 
fracking, the pattern has been simple and consistent: when energy 
development and production is at stake, the energy/property balance 
will adjust private property expectations to accommodate.  
D.   Farm Production 
 Finally, even legislative measures to resolve conflicts between 
property expectations and farm production reflect the ener-
gy/property balance at work. While farming may not fall entirely 
within the vernacular conception of energy, biofuel production, par-
ticularly ethanol, is emerging as a non-negligible energy source. For 
example, since 2005 the federal government has mandated that gaso-
line contain ethanol, which is primarily derived from corn.243 Ethanol 
accounted for 10 percent of the volume of gasoline consumed in the 
United States in 2011.244 Moreover, in 2012, roughly 8.6 percent of    
all the harvested acreage in the United States was used                 
directly for ethanol production,245 which is up from 7 percent in                        
 241. BOSSELMAN ET AL., supra note 158, at 279. 
 242. Coastal Oil & Gas Corp. v. Garza Energy Trust, 268 S.W.3d 1, 11-17 (Tex. 2008) 
(holding that a fracking operation that crossed property lines two miles below the surface, 
injected materials under the neighbors lands, and withdrew gas from under the neighbor’s 
land created no actionable trespass absent injury to the surface of the land).   
 243. See, e.g., Nearly Half of Corn Devoted to Fuel Production Despite Historic Drought, 
HUFFINGTON POST (Aug. 18, 2012, 12:51 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/08/17/ 
ethanol-mandate_n_1799046.html. 
 244. Frequently Asked Questions: How Much Ethanol Is in Gasoline and How Does It 
Affect Fuel Economy?, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., http://www.eia.gov/tools/faqs/ 
faq.cfm?id=27&t=10 (last updated Apr. 12, 2013). 
 245. According to the National Corn Growers Association, in 2012, 30.8 percent of     
corn grown in the United States was used for ethanol production. See NAT’L CORN 
GROWERS ASS’N, WORLD OF CORN: UNLIMITED POSSIBILITIES 11 (2013), available at 
http://www.ncga.com/upload/files/documents/pdf/WOC%202013.pdf. Since corn comprised 
roughly 87.4 million of the 310.6 million crop acres harvested in the United States that 
year, this means corn accounted for roughly 28 percent of all United States crop acres har-
vested that year. See id. at 4. Thus, if we assume that 30.8 percent of that 28 percent of 
acreage was used for ethanol production (i.e., if acreage is proportional to the amount of 
corn produced and used in ethanol production), then that shows 8.6 percent of acreage was 
used for ethanol production. Expressed mathematically: 30.8% (corn used for ethanol) x 
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2011.246 Thus farm production has a substantial impact on energy 
production, and due to the vast area of farmland harvested for etha-
nol production—almost 23 million acres in 2011247 and 26.3 million 
acres in 2012248—many property disputes over farmland are also nec-
essarily disputes over energy-producing land.249  
 When farm production, and its attendant smells, dust, and noise, 
has come into conflict with property expectations regarding the right 
to use and enjoy, state “right-to-farm” statutes have limited or even 
eliminated landowners’ abilities to bring nuisance challenges against 
farms.250 Every state has a statute limiting nuisance suits against 
farms, but the limitations vary.251 Milder approaches essentially    
create a statute of limitations for challenging objectionable activity252 
or codify the common law “coming to the nuisance” doctrine that   
prevents landowners from moving next to a preexisting activity and 
then challenging it as a nuisance.253 Slightly more expansive statutes 
foreclose nuisance challenges against certain “qualifying manage-
ment practices”254 or against expansion and increased production.255 
Finally, some states have offered blanket nuisance immunity for 
farming operations.256 
28% (acreage of land used for corn) = 8.6% (acreage of land used for corn that was ultimate-
ly used in ethanol). 
 246. According to the National Corn Growers Association, in 2011, 27.3 percent of corn 
grown in the United States was used for ethanol production, and corn comprised 28.5 per-
cent of all United States crop acres harvested that year. See NAT’L CORN GROWERS ASS’N, 
CORN: ROOTED IN HUMAN HISTORY 4-5, 7 (2012), available at http://www.ncga.com/uploads/ 
useruploads/woc_2012.pdf. Thus, if we assume that 27.3 percent of that 28.5 percent of 
acreage was used for ethanol production (i.e., if acreage is proportional to the amount of 
corn produced and used in ethanol production), then that shows 7 percent of acreage was 
used for ethanol production. Expressed mathematically: 27.3% (corn used for ethanol) x 
28.5% (acreage of land used for corn) = 7.7% (acreage of land used for corn that was ulti-
mately used in ethanol). 
 247. See NAT’L CORN GROWERS ASS’N, supra note 246, at 5, 7. This 23 million figure is 
based on the following calculation (which assumes a proportional yield of corn per acreage): 
83.9 million (total acres of corn harvested) x 27.3% (corn used for fuel ethanol) = 22.9 mil-
lion (acres of corn to be used for ethanol).    
 248. See NAT’L CORN GROWERS ASS’N, supra note 245, at 4, 12. This 26.3 million figure 
is based on the following calculation (which assumes a proportional yield of corn per acre-
age): 87.3 million (total acres of corn harvested) x 30.2% (corn used for fuel ethanol) = 26.3 
million (acres of corn to be used for ethanol).    
 249. More conceptually, farm production in the form of food is an essential energy 
source for humans. 
 250. Terence J. Centner, Governments and Unconstitutional Takings: When Do Right-
to-Farm Laws Go Too Far?, 33 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 87, 142 (2006). 
 251. Id. at 87, 94-95. 
 252. Id. at 98. 
 253. Id. at 95. 
 254. Id. at 107. 
 255. Id. at 102-04. 
 256. Id. at 114 (describing this approach as “extremely favorable dispensation to agri-
culture”). 
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 Since the inquiry into nuisance has always turned on principles of 
reasonableness,257 these milder limitations that effectively define 
reasonable behavior do not create a great shift in property rights. 
However, measures insulating farms from nuisance actions effective-
ly create a no-liability rule by removing property owners’ expectation 
of seeking possible property-rule or liability-rule protection.   
 In addition, right-to-farm statutes have also consistently with-
stood takings challenges.258 Of the fifty states’ right-to-farm statutes, 
only Iowa’s, which took the extreme approach of granting expansive 
immunity for animal feeding operations,259 has been found to create a 
compensable taking.260 Further, commentators have roundly criti-
cized the Iowa decision for applying the incorrect legal standard,261 
suggesting that had the court applied the appropriate standard          
it would have found no taking262 and that the decision should not      
be followed.263 
 Therefore, while right-to-farm statutes may not be the quintessen-
tial example of energy-development policies, they do encourage ener-
gy production and demonstrate a similar energy/property balance. 
 257. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 822(a) (1979). 
 258. Centner, supra note 250, at 138 (“Under state laws that employ the traditional 
right-to-farm doctrine, plaintiffs will not be able to mount successful takings challenges. 
The coming to the nuisance doctrine is a permissible extension of state law.” (footnote 
omitted)); id. at 139 (“Right-to-farm laws that provide statutes of limitation have been 
challenged and have withstood scrutiny.”); id. (“Right-to-farm laws that extend their pro-
tection to minor adjustments of activities should withstand scrutiny.”). 
 259. Id. at 140. 
 260. See id. at 125 (observing that invasions of personal interests in land do not consti-
tute a physical invasion so they are not per se takings); Jeffry R. Gittins, Comment, Bor-
mann Revisited: Using the Penn Central Test to Determine the Constitutionality of Right-to-
Farm Statutes, 2006 BYU L. REV. 1381, 1396 (noting that Iowa’s Bormann decision has not 
been accepted by courts outside of Iowa); Jason Jordan, Comment, A Pig in the Parlor or 
Food on the Table: Is Texas’s Right to Farm Act an Unconstitutional Mechanism to Perpet-
uate Nuisances or Sound Public Policy Ensuring Sustainable Growth?, 42 TEX. TECH. L. 
REV. 943, 960-62, 972-77 (2010) (summarizing Oregon, California, Idaho, and Indiana cas-
es upholding the constitutionality of right-to-farm laws and evaluating a Texas anti-
nuisance law to conclude that it does not result in a unconstitutional physical taking). 
 261. See Adam Van Buskirk, Right-to-Farm Laws as “Takings” in Light of Bormann v. 
Board of Supervisors and Moon v. North Idaho Farmers Association, 11 ALB. L. ENVTL. 
OUTLOOK J. 169, 192-96 (2006) (arguing that the Penn Central balancing test is the appro-
priate test for evaluating whether right-to-farm statutes constitute takings); Centner, su-
pra note 250, at 119-20; Gittins, supra note 260, at 1407-10 (arguing for the Penn Central 
test for evaluating right to farm statutes). 
 262. Jennifer L. Beidel, Pennsylvania’s Right-to-Farm Law: A Relief for Farmers or an 
Unconstitutional Taking?, 110 PENN ST. L. REV. 163, 176-84 (2005) (arguing that the Penn 
Central test is the appropriate standard and that under that test the Iowa statutes would 
not have been takings); Gittins, supra note 260, at 1382 (arguing that most right-to-farm 
statutes will not be found to be takings under the Penn Central balancing test). 
 263. Centner, supra note 250, at 137-38 (“Federal regulatory takings jurisprudence 
suggests it is doubtful that other courts will follow the Iowa decisions to find that a right-
to-farm law effects a taking.”); see also supra notes 259-60 and accompanying text. 
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E.   Conclusion  
 As detailed above, legislatures and courts have consistently 
shaped property expectations to accommodate energy production and 
development. The overarching justification for striking this ener-
gy/property balance has been that at the margins the broad social 
importance of energy production outweighs individual property pro-
tections. Thus courts and legislatures have altered property expecta-
tions, frequently by instituting no-liability rules or by shifting reme-
dies from property rules to liability rules, to encourage the develop-
ment of burgeoning energy resources, to increase the efficiency of 
production, and to overcome coordination failures or holdout prob-
lems.264 This energy/property balance has informed property expecta-
tions since colonial reliance on firewood and water, and it continues 
to play a role in supporting modern energy sources from fracking to 
ethanol and beyond. 
V.   APPLYING THE ENERGY/PROPERTY BALANCE                                           
TO AGGRESSIVE RENEWABLE ENERGY POLICIES 
 This Part examines how the energy/property balance applies to 
the modern energy context, particularly in terms of current energy-
versus-property conflicts presented by aggressive efforts to promote 
distributed generation and microgrid development. First, this Part 
discusses how the energy/property balance informs a property own-
er’s reasonable expectations when the right to exclude and the right 
to use and enjoy are pitted against energy production. Next, it high-
lights the normative justifications for applying the energy/property 
balance to renewable energy projects. Finally, it considers how the 
energy/property balance informs takings claims regarding aggressive 
renewable energy policies, ultimately concluding that takings con-
cerns offer no impediment to these policies.  
A.   Reasonable Expectations 
 While mere historical practice alone may not be sufficient to justi-
fy the continuation of legal regimes,265 much of our law is based on 
synthesized patterns of historical operation and expectation. This is 
particularly true of property law, which is centered upon expecta-
tions266 drawn from “background principles,” “existing rules [and] 
 264. In a follow-up piece, I plan to offer a full discussion of how the energy/property 
balance fits into modern property theory in its approach to addressing these concerns.   
 265. See, e.g., OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, The Path Of The Law, in COLLECTED LEGAL 
PAPERS 167, 187 (1920) (“It is revolting to have no better reason for a rule of law than that 
so it was laid down in the time of Henry IV.”). 
 266. See, e.g., Carol M. Rose, Crystals and Mud in Property Law, 40 STAN. L. REV. 577, 
577 (1988) (“[A]s Jeremy Bentham said long ago, property is ‘nothing but a basis of expec-
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understandings,” past practices, common-law precedents, and past 
actions of state legislatures to form and shape property rights.267 
These expectations form the basis of the right to exclude or the right 
to use and enjoy, and they indicate whether owners can count on 
property-rule, liability-rule, or no-liability-rule remedies for in-
fringement on these rights. It is little wonder that doctrines focus on 
“investment-backed expectations”268 and “background principles”269 to 
determine whether government action constitutes a compensable 
taking of property rights.     
 In this light, the previous Part’s review of the energy/property 
balance shows more than just a historical pattern. Rather, it shows 
how legislatures and courts have consistently shaped rules and un-
derstandings of property to create an expectation that property rights 
are less robust and less compensable when they conflict with energy 
development. In fact, with its roots tracing back to colonial times and 
beyond, the energy/property balance has sufficient historical pedigree 
to qualify as one of the background principles of property.270 At the 
very least, the energy/property balance informs a property owner’s 
reasonable expectations regarding the remedies she might have    
regarding renewable energy projects. Thus just as the energy/property 
balance indicates that a property owner’s expectations are dimin-
ished in the face of traditional energy sources such as oil and gas or 
coal extraction, so a property owner’s expectations are also limited in 
the face of renewable energy development. This diminished expecta-
tion indicates that the right to exclude or the right to use and enjoy 
may be subject to no-liability remedies if infringed by renewable     
energy projects.   
  
tation.’ ” (quoting J. BENTHAM, THEORY OF LEGISLATION, PRINCIPLES OF THE CIVIL CODE 
pt. 1, ch. 8, at 68 (Baxi ed., Hildreth trans., 1975) (1802))). 
 267. Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1029 (1992) (discussing common law 
background principles as the basis for property rights and expectations); see also id.          
at 1030 (noting that “ ‘existing rules or understandings that stem from an independent 
source such as state law’ . . . define the range of interests that qualify for protection as 
‘property’ ”). 
 268. Penn Central Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 127 (1978).  
 269. Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1029. 
 270. In Lucas, the Court described the background principle thusly: “Any limitation so 
severe cannot be newly legislated or decreed (without compensation), but must inhere in 
the title itself, in the restrictions that background principles of the State’s law of property 
and nuisance already place upon land ownership. A law or decree with such an effect must, 
in other words, do no more than duplicate the result that could have been achieved in the 
courts—by adjacent landowners (or other uniquely affected persons).” Id.  
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B.   Normative Justifications 
 As Justice Holmes famously observed:  
It is revolting to have no better reason for a rule of law than that 
so it was laid down in the time of Henry IV. It is still more revolt-
ing if the grounds upon which it was laid down have vanished  
long since, and the rule simply persists from blind imitation of    
the past.271 
 However, far from being a blind imitation of the past, application 
of the energy/property balance to emerging renewable energy projects 
has strong normative justifications. For example, renewable energy 
projects face the same challenges and concerns that animated the 
energy/property balance in the case of firewood, water, coal, hydro-
power, oil and gas, and farm production. Specifically, distributed 
generation and microgrid projects occasion the same location-specific 
siting challenges, coordination and holdout problems, establishment 
hurdles, and efficiency justifications that were common to past ener-
gy developments. Thus the energy doctrines discussed above remain 
strong and relevant comparators to the renewable energy context. 
Moreover, the exigencies of climate change and historic subsidies for 
fossil fuel energy sources make an even more compelling case that 
renewable energy projects deserve the advantages that property law 
has afforded to other energy sources. 
 First, renewable energy shares the same location-specific concerns 
that traditional energy sources relied on the energy/property balance 
to address. Frequently, access to specific locations is a limiting factor 
in the efficient extraction or production of energy resources, and the 
energy/property balance reached was necessary to facilitate such ac-
cess. For example, oil and gas or coal deposits are only located be-
neath certain tracts, and forced pooling and unitization as well as 
private eminent domain measures provided access to exploit these 
location-specific resources. Similarly, dams used for waterpower or 
hydroelectricity flooded tracts located nearby. Since neither the 
tracts nor bodies of water could be moved, it was necessary to resolve 
these location conflicts; the mill acts and eminent domain exercises 
provided a means of doing so quickly. Even doctrines related to the 
gathering of firewood addressed location-specific concerns. Though 
trees were abundant across the landscape, the difficulty of transport-
ing wood over great distances meant that meaningful access to fire-
wood had to be proximate to its ultimate place of use. Hence the fire 
bote and access to a neighbor’s land provided convenient locations for 
gathering wood at relatively low effort and cost. Similar concerns an-
imated oil and gas pipeline regulations; the location of fields and 
 271. HOLMES, supra note 265, at 187. 
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pipelines meant that often only a single pipeline provided a means of 
transporting oil and gas from the field, so the law required the pipe-
line to take from all the wells on the pipeline.  
 These same location-specific concerns are present in distributed 
generation and microgrid projects as well as in measures to site re-
newable energy on advantageous parcels. Many of the benefits of dis-
tributed generation and microgrids are premised on their location; 
the close proximity of energy production to its place of use allows 
these projects to avoid transmission losses and energy sprawl. Simi-
larly, efforts to site renewable energy facilities on particularly advan-
tageous parcels, such as ideal wind or solar corridors, rely fundamen-
tally on access to specific locations.272 Just as with many of our tradi-
tional energy resources, location can be key to the efficient and effec-
tive production of renewable energy. 
 Renewable energy projects also encounter the same coordination 
failures and holdout problems that the energy/property balance 
helped traditional energy production overcome. Oil and gas develop-
ment suffered from coordination problems that hampered beneficial 
development.273 For example, despite the economically advantageous 
and efficient results of pooling and unitization, parties rarely joined 
together voluntarily. Forced pooling and unitization responded to this 
coordination failure by mandating cooperation. By the same token, 
when property owners surrounding bodies of water failed to coordi-
nate and develop waterpower or hydroelectric projects through pri-
vate market agreements, the mill acts and eminent domain condem-
nations overcame this failure to deal and allowed projects to go for-
ward. Relatedly, strategic holdouts and NIMBY274 objections would 
have forestalled energy development if not for energy/property bal-
ance interventions. For example, pipeline regulations prevent pipe-
line owners from strategically refusing to buy and carry oil and gas 
from certain producers, and right-to-farm statutes prevent NIMBY 
objections to farming operations. 
 Reminiscent of unitization, microgrid development also lags due to 
coordination problems. As discussed above, despite the advantages of 
microgrid systems, few have developed voluntarily, and cognitive 
barriers or market irrationality prevent coordination in these efforts. 
Similarly, renewables projects may face strategic holdout or NIMBY 
opposition. For instance, “[s]trategic behavior, endowment effects, 
 272. See, e.g., Rule, supra note 91. 
 273. See KRAMER & MARTIN, supra note 62, § 1.02 (“The history of oil and gas develop-
ment in the United States leads to the inevitable conclusion that the legal, economic, and 
engineering worlds have never reached a level of coordination that would allow for the 
efficient and equitable development of oil and gas reservoirs without substantial govern-
mental intervention.” (emphasis added)).  
 274. “Not in my backyard.”  
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asymmetric information, or other factors could potentially undermine 
adjacent landowners’ ability to consistently negotiate arrangements 
that allocate scarce wind resources to their highest valued user,”275 
and efforts to allocate wind or solar rights276 are an attempted re-
sponse to some of these coordination problems.   
 In addition to overcoming coordination and holdout problems, the 
energy/property balance fostered energy sources in their infancy, aid-
ing new technologies or resources in overcoming establishment hur-
dles. For example, the mill acts helped waterpower gain a foothold as 
a major energy source of the time, and both the doctrine of capture 
and conservation measures helped spur the rise of oil and gas. The 
energy/property balance nurtured oil and gas, hydropower, and coal 
development, and now it is necessary to support burgeoning distrib-
uted generation and microgrid projects. 
 Finally, the efficiency and reciprocity of advantage reasoning that 
justified the energy/property balance for traditional energy sources 
applies with equal force to renewable energy. The collective social 
benefits of greater energy production at lower costs justified dimin-
ishing property expectations to promote efficient energy develop-
ment. Therefore, while oil could still be produced without forced pool-
ing and unitization or pipeline regulations, while coal could still be 
mined without updated techniques and private imminent domain, 
while waterpower and hydroelectricity could have developed without 
mill acts and eminent domain, and while farming could still occur 
without nuisance protection, in the absence of these regimes all 
would have proceeded more slowly, more expensively, and less effi-
ciently. Legislatures and courts determined that the social benefits of 
quicker, cheaper, and more efficient energy development were shared 
by all of the property owners who suffered diminished property ex-
pectations, and this reciprocity of advantage helped justify applica-
tion of the energy/property balance.  
 Renewable energy too offers major, long-term reciprocity of ad-
vantage that will only increase with quicker, cheaper, and more effi-
cient development. In fact, the advantages of renewable energy    
surpass those of traditional energy sources because renewables offer 
the additional benefits of domestic energy supplies, reduced green-
house gas emissions, lower transmission costs and losses, and re-
duced energy sprawl.   
 Moreover, the combination of climate change realities and historic 
subsidies for fossil fuel sources offers even more compelling justifica-
tions for applying the energy/property balance to renewables. Cur-
rently, greenhouse gas pollution from energy production is accelerat-
 275. Rule, supra note 91, at 218. 
 276. See, e.g., id.  
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ing climate change and its major impacts on human and environmen-
tal health.277 In response, numerous scientific, policy, and advocacy 
organizations have called for a major and immediate greenhouse gas 
reduction. For example, the National Academy of Sciences (“NAS”) 
has concluded that the United States “needs to get started now in 
aggressively pursuing available emission reduction opportunities” 
and has suggested that this will “require a major departure from 
‘business as usual’ in how we produce and use energy.”278 NAS has 
thus concluded that “essentially all available options for reducing 
greenhouse gas emissions (e.g., for energy efficiency, for low-carbon 
electricity production, for low-carbon fuels) will need to be deployed at 
levels near the maximum extent of what . . . is technically possible” 
and that a key policy strategy is “promoting widespread implementa-
tion of existing technologies for energy efficiency and low-carbon en-
ergy sources (such as renewables).”279 These suggestions highlight 
the importance of aggressive efforts to promote renewables and the 
necessity of applying the energy/property balance in support of these 
efforts. Climate change considerations also underscore the 
“goose/gander” argument that if the energy/property balance favored 
energy sources that contributed to climate change, then it should also 
favor renewable sources that help reduce the extent of climate 
change. Put another way, since the energy/property balance has con-
tributed to the problem, it should also be part of the solution.   
 In that vein, applying the energy/property balance to promote    
renewable energy is also necessary to remove market distortions    
and give renewables a chance of competing with traditional fossil   
fuel sources. A history of favoritism has distorted the market to favor 
fossil-fuel-based energy. Fossil fuel sources not only enjoy the ad-
vantage of entrenchment in United States infrastructure, economy, 
and law, but they also continue to benefit from a long history of pref-
erential treatment, including both direct monetary subsidies280 and 
 277. The Hard Facts of Global Warming, SIERRA CLUB, http://action.sierraclub.org/site/ 
PageServer?pagename=NH_GW_Facts (last visited Mar. 4, 2014) (“[O]ur emission of 
greenhouse gas pollution is causing global warming to occur at a much faster rate than 
ever before. The world’s leading climate scientists project that during our children’s life-
times, global warming will raise the average temperature of the planet by 3 to 10 degrees 
Fahrenheit – a shift that will rival the change in temperature since the last ice age. Unless 
we slow, and ultimately reverse, the buildup of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere, we 
will have decades – not millennia – to deal with radical changes in weather patterns, sea 
levels and threats to human health.”).  
 278. Div. on Earth & Life Studies, supra note 90. 
 279. Id. (emphasis added). 
 280. Due to entrenched favoritism of fossil fuel sources in the United States, even a 
policy that treats all energy sources equally will systematically favor fossil fuel sources. 
See, e.g., Amy Wilson Morris & Jessica Owley, Mitigating the Impacts of the Renewable 
Energy Gold Rush, 15 MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. 293, 301 (2014) (noting that the              
“entrenched, subsidy-receiving fossil fuel industry” stands as a limiting factor for solar 
development).  
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implicit subsidies, such as the no-liability rules established by the 
energy/property balance. Among fossil fuels, natural gas enjoys a 
particular position of advantage at the moment. Gas is currently 
cheap due in part to both loosely regulated fracking281 and the bene-
fits of the energy/property balance.282 Absent significant efforts to 
promote renewable energy, gas is likely to come to dominate electri-
cal energy production, causing retrenchment of fossil-fuel-based en-
ergy production and thereby exacerbating climate change impacts.283 
To begin leveling the playing field with natural gas requires at least 
that renewable energy benefit from the same energy/property bal-
ance that gas enjoys.  
C.   Takings 
 The major concern expressed regarding the furthest-reaching ag-
gressive renewable energy policies is that they would constitute tak-
ings. However, under the energy/property balance, which frequently 
imposed a no-liability rule for similar infringements on property ex-
pectations, such actions would not be compensable takings. As has 
been the pattern with energy development in the past, policymakers 
can pursue these aggressive measures to encourage renewable ener-
gy production without fear that courts will find them to be takings. 
 As noted earlier, aggressive renewable energy policies such as 
mandates or limitations on neighbors’ rights create tension with or-
dinary property expectations and occasion concern about takings 
claims.284 However, the energy/property balance diffuses this tension 
by reforming these expectations when they run up against energy 
production, and this shift in expectation diminishes takings concerns. 
Importantly, these shifted property expectations do not change the 
takings inquiry employed by the courts, but they inform its applica-
tion and, unsurprisingly, make it less likely that energy projects will 
constitute takings. Thus the energy/property balance influences both 
regulatory takings and physical takings analyses.   
 First, the energy/property balance may inform the Penn Central 
balancing test for regulatory takings in two ways. It may create a 
background principle that forecloses takings liability for energy de-
 281. See, e.g., Thomas W. Merrill, Four Questions About Fracking, 63 CASE W. RES.      
L. REV. 971, 977-980 (2013) (discussing fracking, cheap natural gas, and the need for        
regulation). 
 282. As noted above, courts have applied a no-liability rule when fracking operations 
have invaded otherwise protected property rights, and this freedom from liability can act 
as a form of subsidy, reducing the cost of natural gas development. See Coastal Oil & Gas 
Corp. v. Garza Energy Trust, 268 S.W.3d 1 (Tex. 2008); see also supra notes 241-42 and 
accompanying text. 
 283. Merrill, supra note 281, at 992 (“Cheap gas . . . is poison for renewables”). 
 284. See discussion supra Part IV. 
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velopment, or, even if it is not a background principle, the ener-
gy/property balance informs the balancing test such that it will be 
difficult to show a taking absent an enormous economic deprivation.  
 As noted above, the history underlying the energy/property bal-
ance is sufficiently long and consistent enough that it may be consid-
ered a background principle of property. Background principles of 
property law inhere with property title and limit property rights; 
laws that simply restate or recreate those background principles 
have not altered, and thus cannot have taken, any existing property 
right.285 Accordingly, if a property owner has no expectation of a rem-
edy when energy development projects infringe on otherwise protect-
ed property rights, then he has no expectation to be free of energy 
development activities and has no property right that can be taken 
by laws promoting energy development.286 If there is no property ex-
pectation infringed, then the Penn Central balancing test becomes 
unnecessary because there cannot be a regulatory taking without an 
underlying property right to take.   
 Alternatively, even if the energy/property balance is not a back-
ground principle, it at least influences the Penn Central balancing 
inquiry, particularly in terms of the investment-backed expectation 
and character of government action. A property owner has little in-
vestment-backed expectation to be free from energy development. As 
extensively discussed, the energy/property balance shapes property 
owners’ expectations such that they should not expect a remedy for 
energy development that infringes on otherwise protected rights to ex-
clude or use and enjoy. Given the long history of the energy/property 
balance, a property owner can be considered aware of these dimin-
ished expectations and reasonably anticipate them; the expectation 
prong therefore cuts against finding a taking.287 Further, the ener-
gy/property balance impacts the character of the government action 
prong because the promotion of energy development advances an  
important public interest and creates a great reciprocity of ad-
 285. As the Supreme Court has stated, “We held in Lucas that the government must 
pay just compensation for such ‘total regulatory takings,’ except to the extent that ‘back-
ground principles of nuisance and property law’ independently restrict the owner’s intend-
ed use of the property.” Lingle v. Chevron, 544 U.S. 528, 538 (2005) (quoting Lucas v. S.C. 
Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1026-1032 (1992)). 
 286. See Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc. v. Fla. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., 560 U.S. 702 
(2010) (holding that under established background principles of property law, a beach res-
toration project did not constitute a taking of property rights).  
 287. See Echeverria, supra note 130, at 184 (discussing the relevant inquiry for reason-
able investment-backed expectation to include “(1) whether the plaintiff operated in a 
‘highly regulated industry;’ (2) whether the plaintiff was aware of the problem that 
spawned the regulation at the time it purchased the property; and (3) whether the plaintiff 
could have ‘reasonably anticipated’ the possibility of such regulation in light of the ‘regula-
tory environment’ at the time of purchase” (quoting Apollo Fuels, Inc. v. United States, 381 
F.3d 1338, 1349 (Fed. Cir. 2004))).   
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vantage.288 As a result, this prong also counsels against takings lia-
bility. Unless an energy production measure arises to a per se taking 
by eliminating all of a property’s value,289 the energy/property bal-
ance virtually ensures that it will not be considered a taking under 
the Penn Central test. 
 Second, the energy/property balance informs the per se physical 
takings rule by adding nuance to the otherwise formalistic frame-
work. Specifically, the energy/property balance shifts the expected 
remedy for a physical invasion from a strict-liability rule to a           
no-liability rule or possibly a liability rule subject to a balancing    
test, depending on the impact to the property. For example, with 
physical intrusions that did not completely foreclose other uses of the 
property, no-liability rules were the norm, as demonstrated by doc-
trines regarding firewood gathering, coal mining, forced pooling, 
forced unitization, pipeline regulation, and subsurface drilling. 
When, however, a physical invasion foreclosed other property uses, as 
in the case of flooding under the mill acts, a landowner was compen-
sated unless she benefitted on the whole. In this case, protection for 
the right to exclude was reduced from a strict-liability rule to a liabil-
ity-rule with a balancing component akin to the Penn Central test. 
The only instance of per se compensation, a strict-liability rule,     
was in the eminent domain context, such as for coal or hydropower, 
where full title to property actually transferred.290 Under the ener-
gy/property balance the remedy for physical invasions seems to turn 
on the quality of the invasion, reflecting a shift from a formalist to a 
functionalist inquiry due to the diminished right to exclude energy 
production activities.   
 Applying these takings tests as informed by the energy/property 
balance to aggressive renewable energy policies shows that the poli-
cies do not constitute compensable takings. First and most simply, 
existing policies—such as New Jersey’s law that a builder must offer 
the option of solar energy, California’s “solar ready” rooftop require-
ment, mandatory solar hot water heaters in Hawaii and Puerto Rico, 
or measures to implement California’s “Zero Net Energy” policy—
 288. See id. at 186-210 (discussing the meaning of the character of the government 
action prong to include “reciprocity of advantage” and “public interest”); see also Hanoch 
Dagan, Just Compensation, Incentives, and Social Meanings, 99 MICH. L. REV. 134, 136 
(2000) (“A takings doctrine attuned to the virtues of social responsibility and equality . . . 
should start with a rule of long-term reciprocity of advantage . . . .”). 
 289. See Lucas, 505 U.S. 1003; see also Echeverria, supra note 130, at 186 (noting that 
most takings challenges do not succeed unless a regulation eliminates nearly all of a prop-
erty’s value). Moreover, as discussed earlier, if the energy/property balance is considered a 
background principle, then an energy production measure will not constitute a taking even 
if it eliminates all of a property’s value. See Lingle, 544 U.S. at 538. 
 290. Under the mill acts, there was no transfer of title to the flooded lands. Cf. 
HORWITZ, supra note 166, at 47. 
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have little to fear from takings claims. None reduces all the economic 
value of a property nor causes a physical invasion that curtails all 
other uses. 
 Second, more aggressive policy proposals should survive takings 
challenges for largely the same reasons. For example, laws creating 
solar rights or wind rights that foreclose certain land uses291 or a pol-
icies absolving solar and wind projects from nuisance suits292 face on-
ly the Penn Central balancing test because they involve no third-
party physical invasion. Factoring in the energy/property balance, as 
long as these measures do not reduce all the economic value of the 
property, they do not create takings. Further, mandatory microgrid 
installation or mandatory energy development on promising parcels, 
even if they involved compulsory installation of third-party equip-
ment or compulsory third-party access, should not create a taking. 
These measures would not reduce all economic value of the parcel. 
Additionally, as long as the third-party physical invasions did not 
prevent all other use of the property or transfer title outright via em-
inent domain, a no-liability rule should foreclose takings claims.   
 As a result, state and local governments should not allow takings 
concerns to stand in the way of implementing these and other ag-
gressive renewable energy policies.293 The energy/property balance 
shows that as new energy sources have emerged, the law has shaped 
property rights to accommodate them; after all, “[t]he police power 
embodies the community’s ability to regulate and alter the scope of 
entitlements over time as their social meaning changes. This power 
to change the scope of property rights is necessary to preserve their 
social function.”294   
VI.   CONCLUSION 
 When legislatures and courts have weighed energy versus proper-
ty, energy has gotten a thumb on the scale. Throughout our legal his-
tory, courts have accommodated the societal interests in promoting 
energy production even when that meant reshaping fundamental 
private property expectations in the right to exclude, the right to use 
 291. See, e.g., Rule, supra note 91, at 242. 
 292. See Walker, supra note 54. 
 293. The energy/property balance is, of course, bounded by political checks; a govern-
ment must first enact a policy mandating energy development or limiting neighbors’ rights 
for the energy/property balance to impact a takings claim. Further, abuse of the ener-
gy/property balance in other non-renewable energy contexts, such as to promote hydraulic 
fracturing, is not a concern because the law already allows similar practice in those con-
texts. See, e.g., Coastal Oil & Gas Corp. v. Garza Energy Trust, 268 S.W.3d 1 (Tex. 2008). 
Existing energy sources already benefit from the energy/property balance and from the no-
liability rules it imposes.   
 294. Singer & Beermann, supra note 131, at 228. 
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and enjoy, and the remedies available for those rights. Now that re-
newable energy projects face the same hurdles that past energy de-
velopments did, the energy/property balance should tip the same way. 
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